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I. INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty and confusion probably always have existed about
the employment of intellectual property as collateral for a loan.
Since the drafting of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
an uneasy coexistence of state and federal law has developed. Both
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state and federal law now arguably apply when a debtor attempts
to use a patent' or trademark 2 to secure a loan.3 The extent to
I "Patent" refers to United States patents and patent applications subject to the
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-376 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990).
2 "Trademark" refers to all registered marks and all marks for which applications
to register have been filed subject to the Trademark Act of 1946 as amended (the "Lanham
Act"), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1976 & Supp. 1989). As employed by the authors,
the term trademark encompasses service or other marks that technically are not trademarks
but that serve functions similar to trademarks. See 1 J. GsoN, TRADmARK PROTECTION
AND PRACnCE § 1.0211] (1989). This Article refers to nonfederally registered state law
trademark rights as "state trademarks." See generally id. § 1.0413].
3To illustrate the uncertainty that results from this state of affairs, consider security
interests in patents. An attorney may pursue a chain of reasoning and reach conclusions
similar to the following:
a. The Patent Act does not expressly provide for recordation of documents
relating to security interests in patents. However, 35 U.S.C. § 261 provides
for permissive recordation of documents relating to assigriments of patents in
the Patent and Trademark Office. Recordation provides constructive notice.
b. Patent regulations provide that other instruments affecting title to patents
may be recorded. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.331 - 1.334 (1989). The Patent and
Trademark Office is willing to accept filings of financing statements or other
documents relating to security interests. See Patent and Trademark Office,
Helpful Hints for Filing Assignments (on file in the Kentucky Law Journal
Office). However, the recording of such instruments may not provide construc-
tive notice.
c. U.C.C. Article 9, which requires state filings to perfect security interests in
patents or trademarks, applies except to the extent that it is inconsistent with
the Patent Act.
d. Given the above, one way to obtain protection might be (a) to structure
the secured transaction as an assignment and record it m. the Patent and
Trademark Office to obtain the benefits of recordation under 35 U.S.C. §
261; and (b) to file properly completed U.C.C. financing statements in the
proper state office or offices as required by Article 9. The right to use the
patented invention can be licensed back to the assignor.
e. If the transaction is formalized as a security agreement granting a security
interest to a creditor as opposed to an assignment transferring title to the
creditor, then the security agreement or a financing statement might be filed
in the Patent and Trademark Office in the hope that filing will provide actual
notice of the transaction to any searchers who may encounter it even if it is
insufficient to provide constructive notice.
Similarly, ambiguity confronts an attorney seeking to take a security interest in a
trademark. Additionally, the attorney must recognize that a present trademark assignment
that does not include good will of the assignor's business can destroy rights in the mark.
See infra text accompanying notes 346-50. Therefore, it may be necessary to structure the
transaction as an assignment to take place in the future.
The assignment document employed in the case of patents, which creates a present
assignment, sometimes is called a "collateral assignment," a label that is adopted in this
Article. The Article refers to the document often employed in the case of security interests
in trademarks as a "conditional assignment," recognizing however, that these interests also
are formalized as present assignments by many practitioners. Forms employed also may
incorporate both security agreement and assignment terminology, or may be structured as
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which each body of law is applicable and the interaction between
the two systems was left unclear by the drafters of Article 9 and
has not been clarified by Congress.4 The radical differences between
the state and federal systems, both conceptually and as inple-
mented, further complicate the uncertainty in the law 5
This Article proposes reforms for both the federal and state
systems, specifically, the Patent6 and Lanham Acts7 and state se-
mortgages.
This footnote's description of legal practices relating to the use of patents and trade-
marks as collateral is derived from many sources. See generally 1 J. McCARY, TRADE-
mARKS AND UNF, m ComaPrroN § 18:1 (2d ed. 1987); Bramson, Intellectual Property as
Collateral-Patents, Trade Secrets, Trademarks and Copyrights, 36 Bus. LAw. 1567, 1585-
88, 1590-93 (1981); Mesrobian & Schaefer, Secured Transactions Based on Intellectual
Property, 72 J. PAT. & TRAEMARK OMCE Soc. 827, 834, 850 (1990); Nimmer & Krauthaus,
Secured Financing and Information Property Rights, 2 HioH TECH. L.J. 195, 208 (1988);
letter from Terry L. Clark to Prof. Harold Weinberg (February 7, 1990) (discussing Easing
Transfer and Security Interest Transactions in Intellectual Property: An Agenda for Reform)
(on file m the offices of the Kentucky Law Journal); letter from Anne S. Jordan to Prof.
William Woodward and Prof. Harold Weinberg (September 4, 1990) (discussing Easing
Transfer and Security Interest Transactions in Intellectual Property: An Agenda for Reform)
(on file in the offices of the Kentucky Law Journal); letter from John B. Pegram to Prof.
William Woodward and Prof. Harold Weinberg (August 17, 1990) (discussing Easing
Transfer and Security Interest Transactions in Intellectual Property: An Agenda for Reform)
(on file in the offices of the Kentucky Law Journal).
4 Copyrights, a third important example of "federal intellectual property," are sub-
ject to the Copyright Act of 1976 as amended, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810 (West 1977 & Supp.
1990). Copyrights are not considered in this article because assignments of copyrights are
recordable in the Copyright Office rather than in the Patent and Trademark Office, pursuant
to a statute that has received more recent Congressional attention than the Patent and
Lanham Acts. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 205 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990). See generally Note,
Transfers of Copyrights for Security Under the New Copyright Act, 88 YAM L.J. 125
(1978). This article also does not consider security interests in copyrights because the cases
originally giving rise to the current heightened concern over security interests in federal
intellectual property involved patents and trademarks. See infra text accompanying notes
23-31. However, one should not infer that all is well for the employment of copyrights as
collateral. See National Pengrme, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 59 U.S.L.W
2046 (C.D. Calif. 1990) (filing in the Copyright Office is required to protect a security
interest in copyrights from a trustee in bankruptcy challenging it as a lien creditor under
11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1978)).
"Maskworks" fixed in semiconductor chips are a fourth type of federal intellectual
property. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914. They are not considered for the same reason that
copyrights are not considered.
I It might be desirable for security interests in all types of federal intellectual property
to be subject to the same rules. Indeed, perhaps the ideal legal regime would encompass
both security interests in nonfederal assets such as trade secrets and state trademarks as
well as federal intellectual property. However, this Article assumes that state law will
continue to control security interests in state intellectual property. The discussion in Part V
gives some consideration to state intellectual property, but does not attempt to develop in
any comprehensive way Article 9's shortcomings in this field.
6 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-376 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990).
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1976 & Supp. 1989).
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cured transactions law contained in Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.8 Although the primary focus is on the methods for
using patents and trademarks as collateral and the devices for
giving third parties notice of the lender's interest, this Article also
addresses priority9 issues encountered when different parties make
claims to the patent or trademark.
To understand the magnitude of the problems secured lenders
face m lending on patents and federally registered trademarks, the
two systems now in place must be considered. Under the federal
system, the traditional method for taking a security interest in .a
patent has been to take a collateral assignment of the patent and
record that transfer with the Patent and Trademark Office. 10 For-
mally, this method transferred the patent's title to the lender with
the understanding that the debtor would reacquire title once the
debtor repaid the debt." One method for taking a security interest
in a trademark has been to take a conditional assignment and
record it in the Patent and Trademark Office. 2 Under this device,
the debtor is obligated to assign the trademark in the event of
default. Previously, attorneys could feel comfortable relying on
these traditional federal methods and ignonng state personal prop-
erty security law. However, this era ended with the arrival of
Article 9.
Article 9 of the U.C.C. embodies a new approach. Patents and
trademarks are personal property and their use in financing is
governed by Article 9. The basic ideas of personal property security
embodied in Article 9 differ fundamentally from those of federal
intellectual property law. Although pre-U.C.C. law was in some
respects similar to the traditional methods for employing patents
and trademarks as collateral, Article 9 changed the very vocabulary
of secured lending. For example, no longer would one get security
- U.C.C. §§ 9-101 to 9-507 (1989). Unless otherwise specified, citations are to the
1989 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code.
I Tis Article uses the term "priority" in the commercial law sense of the determi-
nation necessary when there are competing property claims to personalty such as security
interests or judgment liens, and not in the intellectual property law sense of the determination
necessary when there are competing clais to the status of first inventor of an invention or
first user of a trademark. Compare U.C.C. Article 9, Part 3 with 15 U.S.C.A. § 1057(c)
(West 1976 & Supp. 1989); 35 U.S.C.A. § 102 (g) (West 1984 & Supp. 1990).
"0 See supra note 3.
" In Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1890), the Supreme Court extended the
title paradigm and concluded that exclusive rights to prosecute infringements were vested in
the lender.
,2 See supra note 3.
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from a "chattel mortgage" or "conditional sale", "security inter-
est" became the term to embrace all forms of secured lending on
personal property 13 Under Article 9, form has little influence on
substance, 14 and the location of title is immaterial. 5 Article 9
generally requires a secured party to file to perfect a security
interest, 16 but what is to be filed and the significance of the filing
differ from the traditional methods.
The breadth of Article 9 reform brought state secured financing
law into contact with federal intellectual property law. The enact-
ment of Article 9 presented the possibifity of much easier use of
intangible property as collateral under the catch-all category of
"general intangibles."17 Patents and trademarks are easily included
in the broad definition of "general intangibles" under the U.C.C.
classification scheme. 8 Unfortunately, the drafters of the U C:C.
did not clearly indicate whether they intended the statute to cover
patents and trademarks.' 9
Assuming that patents and trademarks are forms of personal
property within the scope of the U.C.C., Article 9 would control
how one creates a security interest in the property, where one files
to perfect 2° the interest, what priority the interest has against var-
1 U.C.C. §§ 9-102(1)(a), 1-201(37).
U.C.C. § 9-102(1).
is U.C.C. § 9-202.
16 See U.C.C. §§ 9-302, 9-304, 9-305.
17 U.C.C. § 9-106.
is U.C.C. § 9-106 defines general intangibles as "any personal property (including
things in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, and
money."
19 U.C.C. § 9-104(a) limits Article 9's scope. It provwdes, "It]his Article does not
apply to a security interest subject to any statute of the United States, to the extent that
such statute governs the rights of parties to and third parties affected by transactions in
particular types of property." U.C.C. § 9-104(a). U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(a) indicates that for
secured transactions within Article 9's scope,
[t]he filing of a financing statement otherwise required by this Article is not
necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property subject to a
statute of the United States which provides for a national registration
or which specifies a place of filing different from that specified in this
Article for filing of the security interest
U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(a). See also U.C.C. § 9-302(4). It is unclear whether the Patent and
Lanham Acts are among the statutes of the United States referred to by these provisions
and related commentary. This ambiguity has received extensive consideration elsewhere.
See, e.g., Porto, The Scope of U.C.C. Article 9: Is Filing Under Article 9 Sufficient to
Perfect a Security Interest in a Patent or Trademark?, 93 Comm. L.J. 384, 386-92 (1988).
20 A secured party ordinarily "perfects" a security interest by supplying public notice
of its existence either by filing in a public file or by taking possession. See U.C.C. §§ 9-
302, 9-304, 9-305. See infra note 65. The rights of a perfected secured party vis a vis others
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ious third parties, 2' and the rights and obligations of the parties
on default. Depending on whether the U.C.C. or federal law
controls, the rules governing each of these aspects of financing
may differ. Since Congress has left the older federal system intact,
which system applies to a given transaction and to what extent is
not clear.Y
This uneasy state of affairs injects uncertainty and substantial
transaction costs into financing based on federal intellectual prop-
erty. For nearly ten years, calls for reform have emanated from
many quarters.2 Two cases decided in the mid-1980's underscored
the uneasy situation. City Bank and Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric Inc.uA
and In re Transportation Design and Technology, Inc.2 both held
that a proper U.C.C. filing by itself was sufficient to defeat a
bankruptcy trustee from exercising her hypothetical lien creditor
power under the Bankruptcy Code.26
Apart from illustrating an unsatisfactory status quo, these cases
raised concern among intellectual property lawyers that clients
could no longer rely on the Patent and Trademark Office files in
taking transfers of patents and trademarks. The most troublesome
question raised was whether a person effecting a transfer through
the federal file also must check state U.C.C. files to be certain the
property was unencumbered. Unfortunately, neither Otto Fabric
nor Transportation Design directly resolved such a contest between
a U.C.C.-perfected secured creditor and a non-lien creditor in the
absence of a federal ffling.27 Yet both cases injected enough uncer-
are significantly greater than those of an unperfected secured party. Compare U.C.C. § 9-
301 with U.C.C. §§ 9-307 and 9-312.
21 See supra note 9.
2 See supra notes 3, 19 and accompanying text.
11 See Nimmer and Krauthaus, supra note 3; Porto, supra note 19; Shafer, Creditors'
Rights Issues in Copyright Law: Conflict and Resolution, 11 BALT. L. REV. 406 (1982).
2 83 Bankr. 780 (D. Kan. 1988).
- 48 Bankr. 635 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985).
26 A bankruptcy trustee exercising the rights of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor
will have priority over a security interest that is not properly filed in the state U.C.C.
records prior to bankruptcy regardless of whether any creditor actually checked the state
records or was misled by the absence of a filing. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(a) (West 1979 &
Supp. 1990); U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b).
2 Neither Otto Fabric nor Transportation Design speak directly about a priority
dispute between an Article 9 secured creditor who properly files in the state Article 9 records
but does not record notice of its security interest in the Patent and Trademark Office and
a person who relies on the absence of Patent and Trademark Office filing but does not
check the state records.
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tainty into the reliability of the federal file to demand a state
search in any sizeable transfer of a patent or trademark. 2
The problem that these cases illuminated was recognized early
in the history of Article 9.29 In 1987, the American Bar Association
Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law proposed enact-
ment of federal legislation that would clearly preempt at least some
of Article 930 The Permanent Editorial Board of the U.C.C. has
embarked on a study of Article 9 that could lead to proposed
amendments in many areas including Article 9's treatment of pat-
ents and trademarks as collateral.3 The time has come for action.
This Article begins with two premises. The first is that the
optimal mesh between the federal Patent and Lanham Acts and
Article 9 is one that will maximally reduce uncertainty and legal
complexity and thereby will add (or restore) value to intellectual
property 32 The second premse is that the optimal interaction be-
tween the two systems can be accomplished without compromising
important values of federal intellectual property law. These include
the encouragement of innovation and the early disclosure of inven-
tions in the case of patents, 33 and the assurance that trademarks
13 See also In re Roman Cleanser Co., 43 Bankr. 940, 225 U.S.P.Q. 140 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986) (an earlier trademark
case to the same effect).
29 However, it is evident that intellectual property received much less attention than
other forms of collateral. See 1 G. GiusoRE, SEcuRrry INrEss IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
§§ 13.3, 13.4 (1965).
3See Patent and Trademark Office Affairs, 1987 A.B.A. Sec. Pat. Trademark,
Copyrights C-103-3. See also 1988 A.B.A. Sec. Pat. Trademark, Copyrights C-408-1 to 408-
3; 1989 A.B.A. Sec. Pat. Trademark, Copyrights C-408-1 to 408-2.
31 See Minutes of Meeting, Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 3 (Sept. 23, 1989).
32 Those seeking ownership interests in patents or trademarks and creditors who seek
security interests in these assets share a common legal need: clear, easily accessed information
from which they can determine the quality of an owner's title to intellectual property. They
must be able to determine without undue cost or uncertainty whether the asset is subject to
claims of others who have priority over the potential assignee or lender. If assignees or
lenders must risk losing priority to others with clains they cannot detect in advance, they
will be unwilling to pay or lend as much for an interest in the asset. Similarly, money spent
on reducing title uncertainty will be reflected in the price assignees will pay or in the interest
rate lenders will charge. In short, uncertainty and complexity dimimsh the value of intellec-
tual property as assets for sale or as collateral for loans.
" The United States patent system was established "[t]o promote the Progress of
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Inventors the exclusive right to their
Discoveries." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
489 U.S. 141 (1989) (ultimate goal of the federal patent system is to bring new inventions
into the public domain through disclosure). A frequently offered justification for providing
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designate the manufacturing source or qualities of particular goods. 34
This Article is intended to provoke discussion that will move
the law toward a resolution of these problems. Part II compares
the fundamentally divergent treatments of personal property secu-
rity found in federal law and in Article 9. In Part III, several
reform proposals that have been advanced are surveyed. In Part
IV, this Article considers a solution that the authors have developed
and expect will be controversial. The authors ask whether it would
be sensible to enact a version of Article 9 at the federal level to
cover security interests in patents and trademarks, and at the same
time, establish an electronically accessible U.C.C. filing office within
or near the Patent and Trademark Office in Washington D.C. For
reasons that are set forth below, this solution could substantially
reduce the cost of secured lending on these forms of intellectual
property without adding appreciably to the costs of either trans-
ferring these assets or lending on other kinds of personal property
not subject to the federally enacted Article 9.
The authors recognize that all reform proposals to date con-
cerning security interests in patents and trademarks, including this
Article's, are based on limited data concerning what is undoubtedly
a very diverse universe of financing transactions shaped by the
disparate needs of many different creditors and debtors. For this
reason Part V is intended to serve two purposes. First, Part V
surveys remaining issues that should be considered by policy makers
should federal law embrace Article 9 principles in the way contem-
plated. Second, recognizing that data developed in the future ulti-
mately may point to a solution in which state law controls federal
intellectual property financing, Part V suggests ways in which
Article 9 may be revised to serve this purpose as a matter of state
law The conclusion in Part VI suggests some additional questions
that belong on the reform agenda.
patent protection is that it increases the supply of inventions by providing a means of return
for inventors. See Carter, Owning What Doesn't Exist, 13 HARv. J. L. & PUB. PoL. 99,
102 (1990). The patent system may have other socially beneficial effects as well. See generally
Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 H Av. J. L. & Pun. PoL. 108 (1990).
' See generally 1 J. GIsoN, supra note 2, § 1.03. An important justification for
trademark protection is that trademarks lower consumer search costs. See generally Landes
& Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J. L. & EcoN. 265 (1987).
Trademarks facilitate consumer decisions and create incentives for firms to produce products
with desirable qualities that are not observable before purchase. Economides, The Economics
of Trademarks, 78 TRADmfARK REP. 523, 526 (1988).
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II. CONCEPTUAL AND STATUTORY DISSONANCE
To understand the level of dissonance between state and federal
law, one needs some exposure to the terminology employed in both
systems.
A. Intellectual Property Rights and Terminology
1. Patents
A patent gives its owner the right to exclude others from
"malng, using, or selling the invention" as defined in the patent's
claims.35 It is a bundle of personal property rights that may be
subdivided in many ways.36 The owner may choose to exploit the
patent grant directly, or may elect to exploit it indirectly by trans-
ferring all or some part of the bundle of rights to another person
in return for consideration.37 Indirect exploitation is typically car-
ried out through an "assignment" or a "license."
Assignments are transfers of all or an undivided part of title
in a patent." Assignees should receive substantially all of the
powers, duties, and privileges possessed by the grantor.3 9 This
includes the rights to further assign and to sue for infringement. 40
Unlike assignments, licenses do not represent a transfer of any
property interest in the patent.4 1 Rather, a license is merely a
3 35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (West 1984). See 3 P ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAmzNTALS
§ 16.01(2) (2d ed. 1990).
See 3 P RosEmNEao, supra note 35.
3, See G. SmrrH & R. Pm, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE
AssmrS 173-76 (1989).
38 Concerning who may assign and other federal assignment requirements, see 35
U.S.C.A. §§ 117, 261 (West 1984).
"The law recognizes as "assignments" only those transfers of 1) an entire patent, 2)
an undivided fractional portion of the patent rights, and 3) all rights embraced in a patent
to a specified part of the United States. The assignee takes what amounts to an ownership
interest. See 3 P Rosniiaao, supra note 35, § 16.01[l][a]. Ownership of a fractional
portion of a patent permits the owner to license whomever he pleases, and the licensee can
practice the invention without the consent of the co-owners. See id. The right to the return
of the patent upon the happening of a condition subsequent does not destroy the effective-
ness of the transaction as an assignment. See 5 E. LipscomB, Ln'scoMS's WALKER ON
PATENTs § 19:11 (3d ed. 1986).
40 See 3 P RosmERG, supra note 35, § 16.01[1][a].
-1 See id. at 16.01[1][b]. The rules governing license formation, enforcement, and
termination are governed by general state contract law and not the patent statute. See R.
CHOATE, W FRANcis &-R. CoIuNs, CASES AND MATERIALs ON PATENT LAW 692 (3d ed.
1987) [hereinafter CAsEs AND MATERIAIs].
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pronse of one having an interest in the patent not to sue one
who, but for the license, would be an infringer. In a sense, the
license represents a sharing of rights under a patent rather than a
transfer. 42 Licensees generally cannot sue others for infringement.
A license is considered a personal right that cannot be transferred
absent an express provision authorizing assignment or sublicen-
sing.43 If the license agreement does not expressly forbid the licen-
sor to license others, the license is nonexclusive.
44
The line between assignments and licenses becomes blurred
when a license is exclusive. 45 Exclusive licenses include a promise
by the licensor not to license others to use the invention. Despite
the general rule that licensees cannot sue for infringement, an
exclusive licensee may be permitted to maintain an action for
infringement provided the licensee joins the licensor and any other
persons having an interest in the patent. 46
2. Trademarks
Trademarks are employed by a manufacturer or merchant to
identify her goods and distinguish them from those manufactured
by others.47 Trademark law also distinguishes between assignees
and licensees. An assignment is a sale of all rights in the mark,
whereas a license provides a limited permit to use the mark. 4 The
distinction is important in connection with standing to sue for
trademark infringement. An owner of a federal trademark regis-
tration always has standing to sue for infringement.49 An assignee
of a validly assigned trademark stands in the shoes of the trade-
mark owner and has the same standing to sue the infnnger. 0 After
an assignment, the assignor has divested herself of her trademark
rights, and the assignee's title is superior. Licensees, on the other
41 See 3 P RosENBERo, supra note 35, § 16.01[i][c].
43 Id.
4 Id.
45 Id.
41 Concerning the need for such joinder, see 5 D. CMsUM, PATENrS § 21.0312] (1990).
In general, the foregoing discussion applicable to assignments and licenses under issued
patents also is applicable to assignments and licenses under patent applications. See 5 E.
Lipscomn, supra note 39, § 19:15. Negotiations and agreements relating to assignments and
licenses may precede issuance of the patent. See id. at § 19:16.
47 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
41 See 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 3 at 605-06.
41 See la J. GISON, supra note 2, § 8.16[l][aI.
"' Id.
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAW JouR[AL
hand, have the right to sue for infringement only when their rights
under the license agreement are sufficiently analogous to ownership
rights to confer standing.51 There is general agreement that a truly
exclusive licensee, who may exclude even the licensor from using
the mark, has standing to sue for infringement.5 2
3. Implications for Personal Property Security Law
The patent and trademark laws respectively enable private per-
sons to invest in innovation and to develop positive relationships
with customers.53 Categorizing a transaction as an assignment, an
exclusive license, or a nonexclusive license has legal significance
within these intellectual property systems. It does not necessarily
follow that these categories also must be important whenever pat-
ents or trademarks serve as collateral. As regines of secured lend-
mg are considered, it may become evident that these categories
should play a considerably reduced role.
B. The Conceptual and Systemic Gulf
The Patent and Lanham Acts on one hand, and Article 9 on
the other, embody highly divergent concepts of personal property
security and provide very different legal frameworks for secured
financing.5 4 A threshold inquiry for an attorney concerned with
formalizing an agreement securing a debt with a patent or trade-
mark is how one transfers these intangible rights. Patent and
trademark law approach the problem as one of transferring title
to the intellectual property from the debtor to the creditor. A
collateral assignment of a patent is thought of as vesting title in
the assignee, subject to defeasance through reassignment to the
assignor after repayment of the debt.5 5 Security rights in a trade-
mark are created by entering into a conditional assignment that
passes title in the event of the assignor-debtor's default.5 6 By con-
trast, Article 9 views the problem as one of creating a "security
interest," the incidents of which are the same whether title is
5, Id. at § 8.16[111].
52 Id.
" See Kitch, Property Rights in Inventions, Writings, and Marks, 13 HAzv J. L. &
PuB. PoL'Y. 119, 123 (1990); see supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
14 See supra note 3.
11 See supra note 3; 5 E. Lipscom, supra note 39, § 19.4; 3 P ROSENBERO, supra
note 35, § 16.01I[ll[a].
"See supra note 3.
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conceptualized as being in the secured creditor or in the debtor. 57
Under the U.C.C. model, the debtor may retain the power to
transfer its rights in collateral, although subject to the security
interest.5"
These dissonant concepts are embodied m very different stat-
utory systems of personal property security law. The Patent59 and
Lanham 6O Acts provide minmal statutory machinery, limited for
the most part to the validity, recording, and priority of assign-
ments. Article 9, m contrast, sets out a comprehensive statutory
scheme for security interests in personalty 61 The U.C.C., for ex-
ample, contains provisions regulating the rights of a secured cred-
itor upon the debtor's default and a secured creditor's obligation
to provide the debtor with information concerning the transac-
tion.62
The two statutory systems also differ substantially in their
manner of operation. The framework provided by federal intellec-
tual property law is limited to patents and trademarks.63 The federal
statutes are silent concerning security in related assets such as trade
secrets or state trademarks that later nught become the subject of
federal patent or trademark protection. The framework of Article
9 envelops most forms of tangible and intangible personal property
including patents, all trademarks, trade secrets, and goods. 
6
The conceptual and systemic gulf between federal intellectual
property law and Article 9 may be widest in connection with
their respective treatments of "perfection" by filing65 and
- See U.C.C. §§ 9-202, 9-203(1)(a). A security interest is "an interest in personal
property which secures payment or performance of an obligation." Id. at § 1-201(37).
" See id. at § 9-311.
35 U.S.C.A. § 261 (West 1984).
15 U.S.C.A. § 1060 (West 1963 & Supp. 1990).
61 See U.C.C. § 9-101 Official Comment.
61 Id. §§ 9-208, 9-501 to 507.
, See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1060 (West 1963 & Supp. 1990); 35 U.S.C.A. § 261 (West 1984).
-See U.C.C. §§ 9-102, 9-104.
6" The law for more than a century has kept track of interests in intangibles through
public filings. The objective when either the asset was intangible (as in intellectual property)
or the interest lacked external evidence (as m security interests) was to supply evidence in a
file to which inquirers had access. Such systems reduce risk by supplying external evidence
of the status of the assets in question. See D. BAuD & T. JACKSON, SEcuurrY INTE EsTs
IN PmSONAL PROPERTY 35-81 (2d ed. 1987). Under both federal intellectual property law
and Article 9, filing serves tlus notice function. Article 9 refers to filing as a means to
"perfect" a security interest. See supra note 20. We also will use this term to describe the
act of filing under federal intellectual property law to give notice of what actually is a
secured transaction. Patents and trademarks consist of intangible rights not reified in a
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pnority." The major differences between the federal and state
perfection and priority rules present the most vexing issues of
federal preemption.
1. Filing Systems
Personal property security filing systems provide potential credi-
tors with a means of checking the status of borrowers' assets and
provide lenders who have made secured loans with a method of
perfecting their security nghts. 67 The filing systems of the Patent and
Lanham Acts and of Article 9 each perform these functions to some
degree. 6" However, the federal statutes' theory and practice are
grounded in the older tradition of transaction filing, while the U.C.C.'s
are based upon the more recent approach known as notice filing.69
Section 261 of the Patent Act provides that,
[ain assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void as against any
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration,
without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark
Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of
such subsequent purchase or mortgage.
7 0
This provision resembles mneteenth century chattel mortgage sta-
tutes.7 1 These statutes authorized recording as an alternative to the
written document comparable to a negotiable instrument. Under both federal intellectual
property law and Article 9, they are incapable of being pledged to a secured creditor, and
the only practical means of perfection is public filing. See Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138
U.S. 252, 260 (1891); infra notes 252-55 and accompanying text.
6 See supra note 9.
67 See I Go mORE, supra note 29 and accompanying text. As used in this Article and
by Professor Gilmore, the term "filing statute" includes any statute requiring the deposit,
with a public official, of an agreement or other document relating to a personal property
secured transaction. See id. at § 15.1 n.i.
This clearly is intended in the case of Article 9's system. See U.C.C. § 9-401
comment 1. However, there is considerable doubt concermng the relevance of the Patent
and Lanham Acts' filing provisions to personal property security. See supra note 3.
6, See generally I GnasoRE, supra note 29, at §§ 15.1-15.3.
70 35 U.S.C.A. § 261 (West 1984).
1' Chattel mortgage statutes date back to about 1820 and, as suggested by their name,
generally applied only to tangible personalty. See I Gi.MoRE, supra note 29, at §§ 2.2, 2.8.
Article 9 of the U.C.C. repealed the chattel mortgage statutes. U.C.C. §§ 10-102, 10-103.
The portion of section 261 of the Patent Act quoted An the text is derived from Act of
1870, ch. 230, § 36, 16.Stat. 203 (1870), which contains similar language. The requirement
of recording patent assignments within three months to defeat subsequent purchasers is
traceable back to the Patent Act of 1836. See S. LAw, CoPYmioHT AND PA7mNT LAWS OF
THE U.S. 1790 TO 1866, at 131 (New York 1866).
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secured party's taking a pledge of the collateral to preserve the
secured party's interest in the collateral against third parties. Like
chattel mortgage statutes, section 261 requires that the transaction
document be fied and-contemplates individual and discrete filings
as additional patent assignments are made.72 Section 261 does not
authorize the filing of a broad "umbrella" document that would
give notice of possible future patent assignments m addition to the
current one.73
The federal law further resembles chattel mortgage legislation
in that section 261 provides a filing grace period, apparently on
the assumption that there will be an inevitable gap between the
execution of the assignment document and the act of filing it.7 4
The Patent and Trademark Office maintains a public register,
which can be examned to identify the owner of a particular patent
or all patents owned by a particular person.75 A search would
disclose the name of a creditor who obtained what is in effect a
mortgage on a patent by means of a collateral assignment. 76
The Lanham Act's recording provision closely resembles section
261.77 A creditor wishing to obtain security rights in a trademark
may enter into a conditional assignment that can be recorded in
the trademark records maintained by the Patent and Trademark
Office. 78
35 U.S.C.A. § 261 (West 1984).
7 Chattel mortgage statutes were judicially interpreted to cover after-acquired chattels.
See I GnmoRo, supra note 29, at §§ 2.3-2.5. One commentator suggests including in the
security assignment recorded pursuant to section 261 language relating to future inventions
and improvements similar to an after-acquired property clause. See Bramson, supra note 3,
at 1587 n.107. But see 3 P RosmaERo, supra note 35, § 16.01[l][a].
7' See 1 GIaoan, supra note 29, at § 16.1.
7 The recording system may be searched by assignor or assignee name or by patent
or trademark number. A searcher may obtain an "abstract of title" from the Patent and
Trademark Office or from a private search firm. The authors are grateful to Barbara
Landon Kuebler for her description of the Patent and Trademark Office's recording system.
See also Bramson, supra note 3, at 1574-75.
76 See id. at 1586; supra note 3.
" The Lanham Act's recording provision provides in part,
An assignment shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser for a valuable
consideration without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark
Office within three months after the date thereof or prior to such subsequent
purchase. A separate record of assignments submitted for recording hereunder
shall be maintained m the Patent and Trademark Office.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1060 (West 1963 & Supp. 1990). Unlike the Patent Act's priority rule in 35
U.S.C.A. § 261, the provision does not make recordation effective against subsequent
mortgages. The ongins of this language date back to at least 1905. See Act of 1905, ch.
592, § 10, 33 Stat. 727 (1905).
13 See Bramson, supra note 3, at 1593; supra note 3.
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Underlying the federal system is the notion that one makes
public the actual transaction in which the parties transferred an
interest in the intellectual property This system of transaction filing
may proceed from the nature of intellectual property and from the
multiple functions the federal file serves.7 9 The federal filing system
functions not only to record who has interests in various intellectual
property, but also to document for the owner the scope of the
intellectual property and to document that the property itself ex-
ists. 0 The federal file's function of keeping track of this intangible
property suggests a transactional approach to filing: what is im-
portant under the federal scheme is who has an interest m the
property, not who might have.
The U.C.C. drafters opted for notice fifling, a system very
different from the transaction filing system present in the federal
intellectual property arena. One essential difference is that under
Article 9, filing of the transaction document creating the security
rights is permissive rather than mandatory 11 The common practice
authorized by Article 9 is to file a brief "financing statement,"
which notifies others of the possibility that the named debtor may
have entered into a secured transaction or may thereafter do so.Y
Under the U.C.C. system, the files obviously are not determinative
of rights in property; rather, they are designed to prompt others
to investigate further.83 For those required to file, the filing burdens
are considerably reduced: only a description of the collateral by
item or type and other basic information including the debtor's
validating signature are required.84
The U.C.C. notice filing approach permits innovations that the
federal system does not. Because the U.C.C. fifling speaks in terms
of possible rather than actual secured transactions, a single financ-
ing statement can be sufficient to perfect multiple security interests
between the same debtor and creditor." Because the actual contract
"' Given the resemblance the system has to the forms of state secured lending that
Article 9 displaced, the federal transaction filing system also may reflect the neglect of
policy makers to bring its old-fashioned notions of secured lending up-to-date.
- For example, a patent defines the "metes and bounds" of the patent owner's
monopoly. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 154, 282. A trademark certificate of registration is evidence
of the mark's validity, ownership, and the right to use the mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b),
(d).
., See U.C.C. § 9-402(i).
See id. at §§ 9-110, 9-402(1).
13 See I Gn.MoR, supra note 29, § 15.2.
See U.C.C. §§ 9-110, 9-402(1).
" See U.C.C. § 9-402, comment 2.
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need not be filed, an extended grace period is not needed;8 6 a
secured lender may even file before the loan is closed. The single
filing also can be sufficient to perfect a security interest in collateral
subsequently acquired by the debtor.87 A file searcher who discovers
a financing statement m the debtor's name has the general burden
of further investigation to learn whether an actual secured trans-
action occurred and the specific assets encumbered.88
2. Priority Rules
The federal and Article 9 priority rules are also conceptually
and statutorily different. The most basic difference is the clarity
with which the respective statutes address the various priority con-
tests that might occur in secured lending. The priority rule con-
tained in the Patent Act expressly provides for the priority, against
subsequent purchasers or mortgagees, of an assignment, grant or
conveyance.89 The Lanham Act provides that an assignment is void
against certain subsequent purchasers. 9° These sketchy rules are
adequate only for the most rudimentary priority contests; it is
necessary to refer to patent and trademark law apart from the
statutes to determine the precise nature of the transactions and
persons referred to by these statutes. Even after going to non-
statutory law, whether or how the law deals with a lender who
took a "security interest" (as distinguished from an "assignment")
remains unclear because neither federal statute expressly discusses
"security interests." 9' One's instinct is to equate the concept of a
secured party holding a security interest to that of a person who
" The only exceptions are certain purchase money security interests that are given 10
day grace penods. See U.C.C. §§ 9-107, 9-301(2), 9-312(4).
" See U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 5; U.C.C. § 9-402 comment 2. Before the arrival of
U.C.C. Article 9, courts were openly hostile to the commercial community's attempts to-
bind future property for a current loan. See Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925);
Zartman v. First National Bank of Waterloo, 82 N.E. 127 (N.Y. 1907). Despite Article 9,
some courts remain so. See Com-O-Matic Serv. Co. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 3
U.C.C. Rep. 1112 (R.I. Super. 1966) (an early Article 9 case reflecting the old hostility that
has been roundly criticized). Apart from financing on inventory, federal law has not readily
accepted Article 9's choice that a filing today can bind future property. See Bankruptcy
Reform Act, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 547(b), 547(c)(5) (West 1977 & Supp. 1990); Federal Tax Lien
Act, 26 U.S.C.A. § 6323(c)(2)(B) (West 1989 & Supp. 1990)).
" See U.C.C. § 9-208; 1 GntmoRE, supra note 29, § 15.2.
- See 35 U.S.C.A. § 261 (West 1984).
- See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1060 (West 1963 & Supp. 1990).
91 The collateral and conditional assignment devices were devised for this reason. See
supra note 3.
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takes by assignment, mortgage, or one of the other transaction
types described in the federal statutes. But this cannot be done
with confidence because a security interest is conceptually very
different from the interests acquired through an assignment or one
of the other federally described transactions. 92
Although it has shortconungs for intellectual property financ-
ing, 93 Article 9 has its own set of detailed, specific priority rules
applicable to security interests in intangibles such as patents or
trademarks. 94 In contrast to the federal statutes, the Article 9 rules
are explicit on numerous recurring contests between perfected and
unperfected secured lenders and other lenders, 95 buyers of various
types,9 and lien creditors. 97 Article 9 in most respects also explicitly
rejects form as a controlling consideration, thereby permitting more
freedom for the parties to design the transaction as they see fit.9
92As suggested above in the text accompanying notes 36-52, intellectual property law
distinguishes between assignments and licenses. Transfers of interests in intellectual property
also are categorized. For example, a patent "assignment" transfers the entire interest in a
patented invention or of an undivided portion of such entire interest as to every section of
the United States, whereas a patent "grant" is the same except that it is limited to a portion
of the country. See Preload Enterprises, Inc. v. Pacific Bndge Co., 86 F Supp. 976 (D.
Del. 1949). A patent "mortgage" vests the whole title to a patent in the mortgagee, subject
to defeasance by performance of a condition such as the payment of a debt. See Waterman
v. Shipman, et al., 55 F 982 (2nd Cir. 1893). "Purchaser" refers to persons taking by
assignment. See 5 E. LipscoBa, supra note 39. None of these transaction types are identical
to a security interest that is an interest securing payment or performance of an obligation.
U.C.C. § 1-201(37); cf. In re Refusal, 8 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1446 (1988) (an attorney's retaining
lien is not recordable in the Patent and Trademark Office because it does not constitute
sufficient interest in a patent).
An example of the difference between a patent assignment or a mortgage and a security
agreement creating a security interest is suggested by Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S.
252, 257-58 (1890). There the Court held that the mortgagee was vested with exclusive rights
to prosecute infringement. The conclusion followed from the fact that title was in the
mortgagee. Article 9 rmght well have yielded the opposite result. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-205.
11 While Article 9 is far more complete for purposes of financing than are the Patent
or Lanham Acts, that statute is also incomplete for intellectual property financing. There
is, indeed, little to suggest that the Article 9/drafters gave much consideration to using
intellectual property-state or federal-as collateral for loans. See supra note 29. While no
attempt has been made to systematically detail Article 9's shortcomings for intellectual
property financing, some of the issues emerge below in the text accompanying notes 194-
336.
", In some cases, these rules may generate different results than the federal counter-
part. See infra text acccompanying notes 194-336.
- U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9-312.
96 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9-307, 9-308.
U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b).
9, See generally J. WiTr AND R. SumERs, Ui uORm COMMRCIAL CODE § 22-3 (3d
ed. 1988) (creation of valid and enforceable Article 9 security agreements).
[VOL. 79
INTELLECTUAL. PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS
3. Reprise
The foregoing discussion briefly describes the conceptual and
statutory dissonance between the federal Patent and Lanham Acts
and Article 9 The discord does not automatically reveal which
system is unwise. While Article 9 addresses security interests re-
gardless of form (including the assignments and mortgages contem-
plated by the federal statutes), 99 simply applying Article 9 priority
rules to security interests in patents and trademarks will not nec-
essarily generate the best results as a matter of policy Little evi-
dence exists that these forms of property were extensively considered
by the drafters during the Article's drafting process,1°° and the
priority implications of applying Article 9 to federal intellectual
property have not been expressly considered by Congress. Perhaps,
for example, a secured party who obtains a security interest in a
patent or trademark should have a filing grace period, or perhaps
not. Perhaps security interests in patents or trademarks should
sometimes be perfected automatically without any flung, or perhaps
not. Perhaps the knowledge of a competing claimant should be
relevant in priority disputes, or perhaps not. The point is that these
sorts of questions have never received careful consideration, and
which outcomes are optimal is not clear. Many of these issues are
discussed below.' 0'
Both systems have significant omissions. One omission is the
proper resolution of a conflict between a licensee and secured
lender.10 The federal system did not address this conflict because
the federal system was not designed for secured lending. Article 9
did not address the issue because the U.C.C. was not designed to
deal with the special problems of federal intellectual property
III. ALTERNATIVE REFORM SOLUTIONS
A. Empirical Assumptions Underlying Reform Proposals
The most pressing challenge is to address the problem of two
conceptually different filing systems with an uncertain interrela-
" Article 9 applies "to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to
create a security interest in personal property "U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a).
110 See supra note 29.
1'0 See infra notes 194-336 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 289-336 and accompanying text.
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tionslup. Reform is needed because the current federal and state
systems create uncertainty and high legal costs. The most obvious
long-term cure for some of the uncertainty would be to choose one
filing system to control the perfection of security interests m patents
and trademarks. 103 Ample precedent exists m the Federal Aviation
Act' 4 for giving the federal filing system preemnnence.
05
While selecting the federal system does not address priority and
other knotty problems, at a superficial level, exclusive federal filing
would improve certainty and decrease transaction costs. Tins so-
lution would save the secured party the burden of checking the
state U.C.C. files when making a secured loan on a patent or
trademark because a state filing would have no effect. To the
extent "state" collateral (including "state" intellectual property) is
involved,' °6 however, the secured party still would have to deal
with the state files. What percentage of transactions include only
federal intellectual property, or even what is a typical ratio between
the value of federal and state intellectual property, is unknown.
Unfortunately, such a "federal only" solution to the filing
problem is based on a number of assumptions about secured lend-
ing that have little empirical support. The first assumption is that
search and compliance costs of the federal and state filing systems
are equivalent. The second assumption is about the contours of
the typical transaction th- solution is designed to reach.
If the costs of searching and filing are not equivalent, choosing
a single system could be counterproductive. For example, if a
Patent and Trademark Office search and filing is more compli-
cated, techmcal, and expensive than a U.C.C. search and filing,
then selection made on the basis of per-transaction costs would
result in the U.C.C. system being selected. If transactions within
the federal system were more costly to complete, choosing the
federal system without also reforming it might be more expensive
than the status quo of uncertainty. Such a choice could impose
new costs on those secured parties currently satisfied with the
103 Simple clarification of the current legal status of federal transferees vis a vis state-
protected secured parties would be, in the short run, a vast improvement over the status
quo of uncertainty.
I-4 See 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1983).
101 The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq. (West 1979) and the Federal Tax
Lien Act, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 6321 et seq. (West 1989) defer to the U.C.C. in the sense that
they recognize security interests perfected m accordance with U.C.C. rules.
206 State collateral could include trade secrets and nomntellectual assets such as mven-
tory or receivables. See infra text accompanying notes 111, 117-18.
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limited protection a single U.C.C. filing now provides under the
implications of Otto Fabric.1 A well-considered policy resolution
will depend on additional factors about the nature of secured
lending in this area, such as the relative costs of coping with these
two systems of securing loans with federal intellectual property and
the numbers of different actors who will work within the systems.
Efforts to develop solutions may be hampered by a tendency
to think of two paradigm actors on opposite ends of a spectrum:
the lender whose primary focus is the debtor's intellectual property,
and the lender for whom the debtor's intellectual property is much
less important in the overall lending decision.
The first type of lender might be the lender asked to finance a
high-technology company whose principal assets are its patents.' 08
This lender probably will involve patent counsel in the lending
transaction and expend great effort m assessing the value of the
collateral.'09 Risk assessment would directly involve the Patent and
Trademark Office. In addition to confirming ownership, the lack
of encumbrances, and the expiration date, the prospective lender
would want to assess the patent's strength and whether it may
infnnge."0 Given the substantial contact with the federal filing
system that these activities entail, exclusive federal filing for secu-
rity interests involving this kind of debtor seems most appropriate
and inexpensive; searching or filing in a state U.C.C. file seems
cumbersome when viewed from this perspective.
The second type of lender is very different from the first. The
second lender is asked to finance based on a debtor's inventory,
equipment, and virtually all other personal property, with patents
101 The authors do not know whether there are secured lenders who intentionally take
such nsks. The secured party in Otto Fabric filed both in the state files and in the federal
files. City Bank and Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc., 83 Bankr. 780 (D. Kan. 1988). The
bankruptcy problem for the creditor was that the federal filing was within the 90 day
preference period specified in the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (West 1979). Unless
the state filing was effective, the security interest was avoidable as a preference.
In Transportation Design, on the other hand, the secured creditor filed only in the
state U.C.C. file. In re Transportation Design & Technology, Inc., 48 Bankr. 635, 637
(Bankr. Calif. 1985); cf. Nat'l Pengrne Inc., 59 U.S.L.W 2046 (the secured creditor filed
U.C.C. financing statements in several states but filed nothing in the Copyright Office).
"I Several commentators use such a debtor as their focus. See Engel & Radcliffe,
Intellectual Property Financing for High Technology Companies, 19 U.C.C. L.J. 3 (Summer
1986); Nimmer and Krauthaus, supra note 3.
, Similarly, if the proposed collateral is an important trademark, a lender may
undertake a trademark search to guage the debtor's rights. See Mesrobian & Schaefer, supra
note 3, at 853.
110 Bramson, supra note 3, at 1576-79.
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and trademarks being but a small part of the whole.'11 The value
of the mass of collateral would be assessed primarily at the debtor's
business location and in state U C.C. files, not in Washington,
D.C. If the values of the patents and trademarks were small relative
to the whole, the lender might run the risk that they expired, were
invalid, infringed others, were encumbered, or had been transferred
by the debtor, and thereby save the expense of more precisely
evaluating those components of the collateral in the federal files.
For a lender whose transactions tend to be overwhelmngly domi-
nated by "state" collateral but happen to include patents or trade-
marks, a federal filing and search-particularly a cumbersome
federal filing and search-would add significant expense.
Although the answers to the empirical questions-which types
of transactions are "typical" and what are the comparative trans-
action costs of the respective systems-are unknown, some as-
sumptions that move us toward a tentative resolution might be
made. First, any system, whether federally-domnnated or state-
dominated, is unlikely to save most lenders the burden of confront-
ing the other system. Comparatively few lenders may neatly fit j
into either of the above paradigms and use the federal or the state
system exclusively Instead, more likely a third type of lender exists,
the lender who looks to both systems in a transaction involving
patents or federally registered trademarks.
Assuming that the third type of lender predominates, no "state"
solution can realistically eliminate the need to consult the federal
file if patents or federally registered trademarks are important. The
Patent and Trademark Office issues patents, registers trademarks,
and records ownership interests in both patents and trademarks."
2
It is an essential source of information for analyzing and valuing
MI With respect to both patents and trademarks, this paradigm is oversimplified.
Frequently, the debtor's trademarks surely will not be "incidental" to the secured lender
taking all the debtor's business assets as collateral for financing. That lender will wish to
extract the maximum value from the business on default, and without the trademarks the
secured lender probably would not be able to dispose of the business as a going concern.
This will have a substantial impact on the value of the other collateral in cases in which
the debtor has developed goodwill associated with its trademark.
Similarly, the debtor's patents may enable the debtor to continue making what it sells.
In situations where the secured party holds all the debtor's business assets as collateral, a
right to the patents enables the secured party to liquidate the property at its going concern
value and thereby realize more from the collateral. In such situations, the patents, while
valuable in their own right, improve the value of the other collateral as well and would
hardly be "incidental" to the state collateral.
-- See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1057, 1061 (West 1966 Supp. 1990); 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 151, 261
(West 1984 Supp. 1990).
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legal rights in these intellectual property assets. These functions
are unlikely to change. The United States Constitution's grant of
federal power over patents,13 the intangible nature of patents and
federally registered -trademarks, and the national commercial inter-
ests in them means that a federal office will continue to serve these
functions. Thus, even if a "state-only" system" 4 for recording
security interests in patents and trademarks was chosen and even
if such a system made those security interests valid against later
absolute transfers (i.e., sales) of patents or trademarks," 5 such a
system would not eliminate the need to check the federal files for
any lender interested in verifying the existence and continued va-
lidity of the patent or trademark, the debtor's title, and so forth.
Thus even under the strongest "state-only" system, a secured party
still would have to check the federal file or risk the possibility that
the patent or trademark did not exist or had expired, that the
debtor did not own the collateral, or that the property was worth
far less than the debtor claimed."
6
Unless the Patent and Trademark Office is dismantled or sub-
stantially changed, that office will continue to be the repository of
very critical, information about the debtor's interest in the proposed
collateral and the validity and value of the collateral. If a patent
or trademark is important to the secured party, that party will
have to go to the expense of consulting the federal system to assess
risk. Thus, even the best state-only system will eliminate dual-file
problemsronly for those secured lenders willing to risk the validity
of a debtor's claims of ownership, of patent validity, and of non-
infringement. What proportion of secured lenders make up this
group is not known.1
7
" U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8 establishes the federal interest in patents. See supra note
33.
114 This Article considers a range of "state" solutions in more detail infra notes 131-
44 and accompanying text.
- There are significant problems with such a system, wuch are considered infra notes
131-44 and accompanying text.
"I The need to be involved with the federal system would continue after a security
interest is created. For example, the secured party would need to be certain that periodic
patent maintainance fees are paid, that trademarks are renewed, and so forth. See Mesrobian
& Schaefer, supra note 3, at 838, 855.
"7 A very unscientific Lexis search for cases where lenders took patents and trademarks
as collateral for secured loans yielded interesting data. All cases from 1975 to the present
in all jiunsdictions were searched. In only three (3) of the seventeen (17) cases involving
such collateral did the lender take a security interest only in intellectual property. The
common paradigm was the secured lender who took a broad security interest, which included
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Turning from a "state" to a "federal" solution, choosing a
federal system is unlikely to relieve many lenders of the burden of
consulting the state files. Outside narrow areas of federal involve-
ment, state law generally has dominated secured lending since its
inception. In its Article 9 form, this means the dominance of state
files for security interests in most personal property including much
intangible personal property Under a "federal only" approach,
the state system still will be involved much of the time. Unless the
secured lender is taking only federal intellectual property as collat-
eral, the lender will have to consider the state files both to check
on the quality of the debtor's interest in the other proposed col-
lateral and to perfect a security interest in it. Federal intellectual
property is only a part of the high technology company's intellec-
tual property, which also may include trade secrets, state trade-
marks, and intellectual property that has not achieved federal
protection. Even a high-tech company may have equipment, inven-
tory, accounts, or other assets that have value as collateral and for
which perfection must be in the state files. Thus, moving to a
federal-only system will only reduce dual-file problems for those
transactions whose focus is exclusively on federal intellectual prop-
erty as collateral. What proportion of secured lenders this repre-
sents is unknown, but in all likelihood is a small part.
With the limits of our empirical knowledge in view, some
alternatives that nught warrant consideration are discussed below." 8
the intellectual property, as only one of many types of collateral The cases did not reveal
in any systematic way the approaches these various lenders took to perfecting their security
interests, nor was there any way to deterrmne the relative weight assigned by creditors to
the federal intellectual property as compared to other collateral.
Such creditors may take their security interests in the intellectual property not because
of its value in its own right, but because it might add value to non-intellectual property
collateral by permitting the secured party to dispose of the debtor's business at its going
concern value instead of piecemeal. See supra note 111. To the extent the federal intellectual
property in flus way enhances the value of "state" collateral, the validity of the patent or
trademark will be important to the secured party. A primary method for assessing validity
will continue to involve the federal files.
It may be, as a matter of contemporary business practice, that such secured parties
run the risk that the federal patents or trademarks will be invalid and that, therefore, the
remaimng collateral will be sold in a less desirable way. The authors do not know whether
this is true or not, but suspect that in larger transactions secured parties will seek to reduce
such risks.
"' The discussion below is brief and is focused on simple variations of the filing
systems currently in place. The Article does not discuss the significant substantive omissions
from both systems due, m the federal system, to the fact that it was not designed for
financing and, in the U.C.C. system, to the fact that it was not designed with intellectual
property in the forefront. See supra note 29. The failure of either system to confront
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS
B. Federal-Only Filing Under the Current Federal System
One approach suggested by commentators is to require filing
within a federal filing system m order to perfect a security interest
in a patent or trademark.119 This option has little merit unless the
federal filing system that would be used for recording security
interests were vastly different than the system currently in place.120
The current system-the product of history and a design intended
primarily for other purposes-is burdened with unnecessary con-
straints that probably add costs to secured financing and thereby
dilute the value of patents and trademarks as collateral.
1. Transaction Filing versus Notice Filing
A central problem with the current federal approach to financ-
ing is its transactional approach.' 2' In contrast to the U.C.C.'s
approach in which only one short financing statement is needed
for multiple transactions, the federal system contemplates that
actual transaction documents be filed and that the actual loan
transaction be completed before any filing occurs. Where the debtor
needs ongoing financing and periodically acquires new available
collateral, the federal approach requires multiple document pre-
parations and multiple filings whereas the U.C.C. requires only
one.
Economically significant financing today tends to be ongoing
and fluid, not discrete. In ongoing financing, the transactional
approach involves considerably more expense than the notice filing
approach because the transactional approach involves multiple trips
to the filing office, while notice filing requires only one.'1 Such
expense ultimately falls on the borrower and decreases the value
priority issues concerning licensees is one such omission. Part V develops some of the
matters in its discussion of changes that might be made to Article 9 to better accommodate
financing in this area. See mfra notes 194-336 and accompanying text.
"' Nimmer and Krauthaus, supra note 3, at 226-28; Comment, Perfection of Security
Interests in Intellectual Property: Federal Statutes Preempt Article 9, 57 G. WASH. L. REv.
135, 163-64 (1988).
'2 Nimmner and Kxauthaus, supra note 3, recognize that major reform of the federal
filing system is necessary to move to a federal-only system.
"I For a comparison of transaction and notice filing systems, see supra notes 67-88
and accompanying text.
122 There is an empirical assumption here: that in many cases a debtor will be acquiring
patents and trademarks on an ongoing basis. If most debtors do not have a revolving
inventory of patents and trademarks, the benefits of the notice approach are less significant.
It is obvious that the empirical facts are important on this issue.
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of the patents or trademarks for financing purposes. The federal
filing system, designed to serve needs other than financing, has
accommodated some financing, but transaction filing may not be
an optimal solution.
2. Relation-Back Periods
An implication of transaction filing is a grace period after the
transaction is consummated to permit the filer to file without
exposure to the risk of intervemng interests.' 3 Relation-back per-
iods constitute another major difference between the current federal
system and the Article 9 system. Federal legislation gives a trans-
feree three months following a transfer to record the transfer.2 4 If
he records the transfer within the three-month period, this legisla-
tion protects the transferee against intervemrfg interests.
For a lender looking to intellectual property as collateral, at
least a three-month waiting period exists before she can safely
advance the money.' = If, for example, a debtor transferred the
asset to a transferee on day one and gave a security interest to a
secured creditor on day two, which the secured creditor filed im-
mediately, the secured creditor would lose to the transferee if the
transferee subsequently recorded on day ninety. More generally,
under the federal system, the earliest the secured party can safely
advance funds to the debtor is following a search at the close of
business mnety days after her filing which shows that her filing
has first priority. The U.C.C. has very few situations during which
an unrecorded interest prevails over a later interest. Except where
collateral is moving from state to state, the periods are short.
2 6
'2 See supra text accompanying notes 74, 86.
,2 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1989); 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1989).
'u See, e.g., Mesrobian & Schaefer, supra note 3, at 837 (may not be prudent to make
loan until after the grace period); Nimmer and Krauthaus, supra note 3, at 216 (to like
effect).
126 The general rule under Article 9 is that a financing statement must be filed to
perfect all security interests. See U.C.C. § 9-302(1) and comment 1. However,. certain
security interests are automatically perfected upon their attachment to the collateral or may
be perfected when the secured party takes possession of the collateral. Automatic perfection
may be temporary. See U.C.C. § 9-302(1). Article 9 also provides some short filing grace
periods. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301(2), 9-312(4). See generally J. WHM "D R. SuMMSs, supra
note 98, §§ 24-2, 24-5, 22-8.
A major defect in the U.C.C. is the existence of separate filing systems for each state.
If a debtor owns tangible collateral in several states, several files are implicated. The choice
of law problems have generated a most complex provision of Article 9 designed to point to
the correct file. See U.C.C. § 9-103.
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Complicating the federal statutory relation-back period is the
time it takes for the filing to be entered into the file after subnns-
sion by the filer. In 1981, a commentator estimated that "a delay
of about three months m recording (and thus making available to
the public) patent and trademark assignments"127 existed. If that
delay still prevails, a lender cannot have confidence in the file until
the relation-back and the office delay periods both pass.'2 In a
rapidly moving, competitive economy, a fledgling company seeking
to use its intellectual property as collateral could go out of business
before a secured creditor confidently could advance a secured loan.
Financing is economically valuable in part to the, extent that it
can respond quickly to a business's cyclical or emergency shortfalls.
Long relation-back periods substantially reduce this value. If a
federal-only approach was adopted, the current relation-back pe-
riod and any delay period within the filing office would need to
be reconsidered.
3. The Costs of Change
If those who take federal intellectual property as collateral
generally do not use the federal filing system now, a third problem
with choosing a federal-only system is the transition cost. 29 The
Patent and Trademark Office currently is not equipped to cope
with additional finance filings and searches. Similarly, most com-
mercial lawyers are not equipped to cope with the Patent and
Trademark Office's procedures. To the extent that the federal
office normally does not operate with the speed of U.C.C. filing
offices (or would become slower under the stress of increased
volume), delay and cost would result.
"I Bramson, supra note 3, at 1574 n. 36.
' Federal regulations require that assignments be recorded as promptly as possible
and specify that the date of record is the date the federal office receives the assignment. 37
C.F.R. §§ 1.12, 1.331-332 (1989). The party filing the document will be protected whether
it is promptly accessible to searchers or not. The problem is that this secured party will not
advance the funds until reasonably certain that an earlier assignee has not filed within the
relation-back period. That certainty can come only after the relation-back period and the
office delay penod have both passed.
,29 This assumption is somewhat at odds with the view in thus Article that prudent
secured creditors, in transactions in which reliance is placed on federal intellectual property,
inevitably will consult the federal files. Indeed, some of the reported backlog in the federal
system could be the result of increased use of intellectual property as collateral and the
resulting use of the federal file for financing purposes. Moving to an exclusive federal
system will bring into the federal system additional financing 'transactions. While some
increase in federal activity clearly will occur under such a solution, it could be a small
increase. Obviously more empirical facts are needed.
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- Thus in the short run, costs would result if the Patent and
Trademark Office and "strangers" had to learn to communicate
"legally" with one another. Until the finance community adjusted,
financing would be more difficult and expensive for those needing
it. Eventually, secured creditors would adapt to more cumbersome
Patent and Trademark Office procedures, but the adjustment proc-
ess would be costly.
The benefits of federal filing could outweigh the costs if the
filing system met more of the needs of secured fimancers and their
debtors. The proposal developed below suggests implementation of
an Article 9 approach, which includes substantial changes in the
filing system, to lending on federal intellectual property 130 Moving
to the current federal system, with its transactional approach to
filing and large relation-back periods, would impose costs greater
than those imposed by the unsatisfactory status quo. Moreover,
such a solution would do nothing to reduce non-filing problems
that come with applying federal intellectual property law to fi-
nancing transactions. Moving to a federal filing system also could
entail significant transition costs.
C. Alternative Solutions Involving State Filing
Another possible solution would be to give legal effect through
Article 9 or a variant of it to an otherwise correct state filing
covering patents or trademarks. This solution elinunates the trans-
action filing problems and relation back periods, and brings intel-
lectual property financing into a system designed for personal
property financing generally. However, complications exist.
An immediate problem with a solution involving the state files
is that policy makers must unavoidably confront priority issues
because the federal system will continue to confer rights on some
who file within that system. A proposal that adopts the state system
is incomplete unless it addresses various contests that nught arise
between parties who file only in the state file and parties who file
only in the federal file. Any solution that gave priority to a state
creditor over a creditor who currently gains rights through filing
in the federal file would require federal legislation; solutions giving
less effect to the state filing could probably be achieved through
U.C.C. changes and Congressional acquiescence.
'3 See infra notes 145-92 and accompanying text.
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1. Priority Over All Later Interests
The strongest state filing system that nught be developed would
confer priority over all subsequently filed interests, including ab-
solute transferees ("buyers") of patents and trademarks, who ob-
tain their interests through and file in the federal system. 131 This
would enable the secured party to obtain a relatively "strong"
security interest without confronting the federal system. 132 Article
9 currently gives a perfected secured creditor priority over most
later buyers and, presumably, this is sound secured financing pol-
icy A state law solution that affords such a strong priority seems
implausible, at least at first blush.
Currently, a prospective buyer of a patent or trademark can
find out much of what she needs to know about the property
within the federal system. The federal system contains information
to enable the purchaser to assess the value of what she is purchasing
and to confirm the seller's ownership. If title is "clear" on the
federal record, the purchaser can acquire clear title through assign-
ment without consulting any other files.'33 If an earlier state filing
was given priority over this buyer, the value of the federal filing
system as the repository of information about ownership of the
patent or trademark would be seriously diluted. In the process,
such a solution would require buyers to consult state files as well
as the federal file to determine the quality of the purchase. This
solution seems undesirable as well as politically infeasible.
2. Priority Over Later Security Interests
A less extreme solution would be to give the state U.C.C. filing
priority over later security interests but not over later buyers, and
,3' These parties often take their interests through the legal mechamsm of assignment.
We use the term buyer to avoid confusion with other kinds of assignees.
112 A secured party under a "strong" state solution win run a great deal of risk by
not consulting the federal file. As discussed earlier, this solution will not protect the secured
party against the risks that the patent expired, the debtor transferred the property earlier,
the debtor did not own it at all, or the debtor has federal intellectual property worth much
less than the debtor claims. Obtaining this information requires consulting the federal file.
See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
M' The assumption here is that neither City Bank and Trust Co., 83 Bankr. 780, nor
In re Transportation Design, 48 Bankr. 635, establish that a state-perfected security interest
prevails over a later federal transferee who has no actual notice of the state filing. Although
the courts in both cases held that state filing was adequate to protect a security interest in
federal intellectual property against the trustee in bankruptcy, it requires considerable-and
probably unwarranted-extension of the cases for the state filing to protect against bona
fide federal purchasers.
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would make a federal filing ineffective to perfect a security interest.
This would enable the secured party to get information about loans
on the debtor's patents and trademarks from the state file. One
implication is that both the collateral assignment and conditional
assignment would be eliminated as methods for obtaining a security
interest in a patent or trademark. 134 Apart from the transition costs
such a change might entail, 135 this solution may decrease protection
now available to some secured lenders. Today lenders may be able
to obtain prionty over all later assignees, including buyers, by
taking a collateral assignment through the federal system, 136 and it
may not be good policy to eliminate this option. Yet as considered
above, 37 a state-only option is unlikely to preserve this measure of
priority 138
An even less drastic state solution would be to give a state
filing priority over all later security interests but to permit federal
filing as an alternative to state filing. 139 The problem with this
solution is that information in the state file would be incomplete.
In order to get complete information about the debtor's secured
loans on patents and trademarks, the secured party would have to
consult both state and federal files. Additionally, this solution
creates a circular priority problem' 40 that should be. avoided.
13 See supra note 3.
'" The transition costs depend on empincal facts concerning what lenders do now.
The authors do not have those facts and no one has attempted to develop them.
"3 This is anything but certain. See supra note 3.
137 See supra note 133.
M Additionally, lenders who take collateral assignments or conditional assignments
have or obtain absolute title on the debtor's default. This may give them the equivalent of
strict foreclosure-the value of the collateral even when it exceeds the amount of the
underlying debt. Although it seems doubtful that a court would sustain such a "forfeiture,"
the structure of the federal transaction as a transfer of title obscures what may be the
debtor's right to the surplus. The extent to which foreclosing secured creditors in fact retain
value exceeding the amount of the debtor's obligation is unknown. Finally, this variation
would invite creative legal maneuvers to disguise security interests as "assignments" and
thereby obtain priority over subsequent buyers or protect against an invalid state filing. The
uncertain mesh of Article 9 and federal law, in attempting to sort out the essence of such
transactions, would add expense to intellectual property financing. The U.C.C. clearly and
unambiguously would limit strict foreclosure in these circumstances. See U.C.C. §§ 9-504(2),
9-505(2).
9 This model finds an analogy in fixture filing, a method by which the holder of an
Article 9 security interest in real estate fixtures can gain priority over a conflicting interest
in the fixtures held by a mortgagee. See U.C.C. §§ 9-313, 9-401(i). In some instances either
a filing in the ordinary goods records or a fixture filing in the real property records is
sufficient to perfect an Article 9 security interest in fixtures. However, a perfected secured
party will gain priority over a real estate encumbrancer only if she makes a special fixture
filing. See U.C.C. §§ 9-313 (4)(b), (d); 9-401(a)(g).
"4 Secured party one files in the state file but not in the federal file. Secured party
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A final related model would leave state law intact, require a
state filing to defeat all persons except a buyer, and additionally
require a federal filing if the claimant wanted to defeat a buyer.
A secured lender wishing protection only from other secured lend-
ers and lien creditors would file in the state files; if she wanted
protection against buyers, she would have to file in the federal file
as well. Enabling the secured party to select the level of protection
may be good as an economic matter. One problem with this solu-
tion is it would probably result in multiple filings in most situations
because secured parties would find the extra measure of protection
against buyers afforded by a federal filing to be worthwhile and
would be visiting the federal office anyway to ascertain validity,
value, etc. A solution that, in fact required multiple filings may
not be an optimal one.'
4 '
3. Priority Over Later Lien Creditors
Perhaps the least drastic state solution to the filing problem
would recognize the state filing as effective to perfect the security
interest against subsequent lien creditors but give all those who
subsequently take interests in the collateral and file in the federal
system priority over the state-filed security interest. This solution
may reflect the legal status quo. 42
This solution is probably the least disruptive of all the solutions
and saves all parties the costs of changing to a different system.
Those who take security interests through the federal system would
be permitted to continue using the method they have been using.
Those parties would not need to worry about the state system
because their federal filings would protect them against all state
filings. Similarly, state lenders who now run the isks of unknown
problems within the federal file could continue to run those risks
and yet achieve perfected status good against lien creditors through
state filing.
two subsequently takes a collateral assignment through the federal file. Buyer then purchases
the patent. Secured party two has priority over the buyer, but secured party one has priority
over secured party two. However, buyer has priority over secured party one.
,41 There are other reasons to question this solution. See infra text beginning at note
175.
142 Otto Fabric and Transportation Design decided only that a state filing was sufficient
to defeat a trustee in bankruptcy utilizing her lien creditor power granted in 11 U.S.C. §
544(a) (1988). They did not decide the priority issues in any contest in which one party
properly filed in the state file and the competitor in the federal file. See supra notes 23-31
and accompanying text.
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The problem is that the consequences of "perfected status" are
quite limited. This solution serves only to give the state secured
party priority primarily over lien creditors-principally the trustee
in bankruptcy 143 The problem is that apart from improving pre-
dictability, this approach supplies a priority far weaker than se-
cured creditors ordinarily get through Article 9. A federal filing m
the unsatisfactory federal system would be required under this
solution to get the equivalent of Article 9 priority Thus this
solution does little to address fundamental problems of financing
based on patents and trademarks. 144 While mimizing disruptive
changes in the law may be good, the fact that the current system
bumbles along or that lenders have learned to cope with it does
not mean that the current system is serving or will continue to
serve commercial needs well. The authors' view is that the current
system is in need of fundamental, basic reform.
"4' There are other pnority consequences because the Article 9 priority system controls
as long as there is no federal filing. So, for example, the security interest filed only m the
state file would defeat later unperfected security interests, U.C.C. §§ 9-301(l)(a), 9-312, and
would defeat secured parties who filed only in the state file but later than the claimant.
U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a). In a regime such as that described m which a federal filing would
defeat an earlier state filing, we doubt that many secured lenders would feel confident of
their security with only a state filing-such a filing would give them very limited protection.
" There is also a problem with formulating a priority rule targeted at lien creditors
and, specifically, at the bankruptcy trustee who is the principal "lien creditor" and the
antagonist a secured creditor may fear the most. It is ordinarily sensible to prefer a perfected
secured party over a later lien creditor because in extending credit the secured party relied
on the availability of specific assets and the lien creditor did not. The problem here is that
the secured party's actual reliance under this formulation is, by hypothesis, quite low. Of
course, we cannot use the secured party's reliance on the priority rule we are considering
to justify the rule itself: the filing itself will not show "reliance" unless we first formulate
a rule that tells the secured party that a filing will offer protection. Our secured lender here
is the creditor who, by hypothesis, has not made the trip to the Patent and Trademark
Office to ascertain title, validity, value, etc. but nonetheless wants pnority over lien creditors
and the trustee in bankruptcy as to whatever turns up that is of value. State legislatures
and Congress must ask why this lender is more deserving than its competitors for the
debtor's assets. Put another way, does this lender have sufficient equity to favor him over
creditors with long past due obligations who have struggled to brmg the debtor to judgment
and, in the bankruptcy situation, over claimants such as trustees and administrators, tort
creditors, employees, and other non-reliance creditors served by the bankruptcy process?
This reform solution forces state legislatures to confront directly the contest between this
secured lender and the person who has struggled through its courts for redress. The
alternative forces Congress to address this contest from the perspective of bankruptcy policy
and priorities. State legislatures and Congress might well balk at a solution that would so
obviously tend to erode the already meager pool of assets otherwise available to judgment
creditors and pnority claimants in bankruptcy.
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IV AN ALTERNATIVE INVOLVING SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL SYSTEM
CHANGE
The principal impediment to the federal-only approach is the
current federal system itself. As currently organized and adnums-
tered, the federal system cannot cope with secured financing either
conceptually or in practice. Because it is a transactional system, it
is not equipped for ongoing financing and includes substantial
relation-back periods that probably interfere with the financing
needs of many debtors. A federal-only solution is plausible only if
the federal system itself is changed.
The problem is that the nature of the current federal filing
system would need to be changed in fundamental ways to make it
optimally serve the interests of secured financing. But it makes
little sense to do that to accommodate secured financing because
the federal filing system serves many functions, particularly re-
cording ownership for purposes of determining who has the right
to sue for infringement. Recording ownership for purposes of
secured lending may be secondary to the main purpose the file
serves. While the current filing system could be improved, the
improvements should be addressed to problems in the system's
performance of its primary functions, such as documenting federal
intellectual property and recording ownership interests in non-
lending transactions. Whether the system could perform those func-
tions as well if it were redesigned to optimally serve the needs of
secured financing is questionable.
The fact that the federal filing system cannot serve all needs
well does not mean reform is impossible. Rather than tinkering
with the current federal system, developing another federal filing
system specifically designed to serve the needs of secured lending
should be considered.
Congress could establish a U.C.C. filing office either physically
within or near the Patent and Trademark Office to be administered
by that office, and enact a version of Article 9145 to govern security
,41 See infra note 182 and accompanying text for consideration of a one-part variation:
a federal U.C.C. filing office and Congressional deferral to state-enacted Article 9.
As should be obvious to one familiar with Article 9, the whole of the statute need not
be enacted to control financing in federal intellectual property. As a statute designed to
control the entire range of personal property financing, Article 9 is far broader than it
needs be to address this field. In the drafting process, sections that are clearly irrelevant
could be excised from the legislation. Some very obvious candidates are the provisions that
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAw JouRNAL
interests in patents and trademarks. 146 Such legislation would pro-
vide first, that to perfect a security interest in a patent or trademark
one must file a document that satisfies Article 9 (a "federal fi-
nancing statement") within the new federal office' 47 and second,
that a security interest (as defined in Article 9) in patents and
trademarks is subject to the rules of a federal Article 9 (the "federal
text"). The files in the new office would be computerized, organ-
ized like other U.C.C. files according to the names of debtors, and
would be technologically capable of being accessed from other
computer locations throughout the United States.'48
The implications of this two-part proposal are many. The
U.C.C. priority rules would become a part of the new system
through the federal text, unless those rules are modified by Con-
gress. The current Article 9 rules would yield perfected secured
party priority over later transferees149 and priority dating from the
time of filing that extends to patents and trademarks the debtor
acquired after the time of the filing. Knowledge of an unfiled
security interest would have a greatly reduced bearing on priority 150
Default and disposition of the collateral would be explicitly con-
trolled by Article 9 rules.1
5'
deal with fixtures (U.C.C. § 9-313), multi-state filing choices (U.C.C. § 9-103), and intrastate
filing choices (U.C.C. § 9-401). Additionally, some provisions from other U.C.C. Articles
would probably be needed: some general provisions from Article 1 such as rules of con-
struction (U.C.C. § 1-102), various definitions such as "creditor" and "security interest"
(U.C.C. §§ 1-201(12), 1-201(37)), etc. The extent to which non-Article 9 provisions should
be included would depend on the extent to which it would be undesirable to defer to state
law on these issues.
, Although financing based on federal copyrights is not addressed in this Article,
much of what is proposed in this Article would apply as well to copyrights. A federal
regime that used the same easily-understood and adminstered rules for all three varieties
of federal intellectual property certainly would be preferable to one that used such rules for
only two out of the three.
,47 As will be seen infra in the text accompanying notes 279-80, this proposal would
require federal legislation specifying that the existing priority rules in the Patent and Lanham
Acts are limited to determimng ownership.
M Congress will have the opportunity to create a system that avoids many of the
difficulties experienced in state U.C.C. filing offices. See generally B. CLARK, THE LAW OF
SECuRED TRANSACTIONS UNDER TBm UNMoaM COMMERCIAL CODE 2.18 (2d ed. 1988).
"49 See infra text accompanying notes 275-336.
" This would clearly be a change from the current Patent Act, which gives priority
to "a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice. "
35 U.S.C. § 261 (1989); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1989) (comparable section in the Lanham
Act).
Ist See infra text accompanying notes 338-42.
[VCOL. 79
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS
Before evaluating the suitability of the 1989 Text of Article 9
for federal enactment, the next sections evaluate the perceived
benefits and costs of this alternative.
A. Benefits of a System of Streamlined Federal'Fiing and Article
9 Rules
Article 9 was designed specifically for secured financing, and
despite a possible future revision,152 it serves secured financing far
better than the myriad prior systems. By establishing an Article 9
filing office and utilizing a version of Article 9 for patents and
trademarks, Congress would establish a time-proven regime to
govern financing based on federal intellectual property The bene-
fits Article 9 bnngs to secured financing13 include reduced paper-
work, a substantial increase in certainty, more flexible financing,
and a comfortable fit with related financing on-"state" property
A direct advantage of moving to Article 9 is paperwork reduc-
tion. By eliminating some of the costly paperwork and forms
implicit in a current Patent and Trademark Office filing, the costs
of making secured loans on patents and trademarks would be
reduced. Searches and filings would become simpler, cheaper, and
less numerous because of the shift from transaction to notice filing.
In a competitive market, the savings could ultimately inure to the
benefit of the borrowers.1 5
4
More subtly, the change would clarify what law controlled
various issues, including priority issues. This clarification would
reduce the costs of contracting. Moreover, because the priority
rules of Article 9 are more certain than those under our current
dual system, the predictability of outcome would be improved and
the costs of dispute resolution correspondingly reduced. The legal
status of secured creditors also would be clarified. Under current
practice many lenders take title to intellectual property through
lu See Minutes of Meeting, Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial
Code, September 23, 1989, 3.
"I Those benefits are the subject of extensive literature. See generally 1 G. GLMoRE,
supra note 29, §§ 9, 10 (discussion of the background and history of Article 9 and the
scope and coverage of the Article); J. WimE & R. Stmou, supra note 98, § 21 (scope of
Article 9).
"4 In general, a decline in costs leads to an increase in output and a fall in price if all
other things are held constant. See T. CALvANI AND J. SmarEGD, EcoNomuc ANALYsis AND
ANTrrRUsT LAw 36-37 (1979). Thus, a reduction in the transaction costs of intellectual
property-based financing would tend to benefit consumers of the financing.
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collateral assignments. 55 Under Article 9 secured parties' exposure
to ownership risks and responsibilities such as infringement liability
should be greatly reduced because a security interest is not the
same as title.1
56
Moving from a transactional system to a notice system em-
bracing the priority rules of Article 9 would enable lenders to
conduct ongoing financing for those debtors that had a varying
collection of intellectual property assets. Financing could be con-
ducted with substantially reduced transaction costs because one
federal filing under the new system would probably yield greater
protection than multiple uncertain filings under the old system.
Notice filing also would offer continuing, low cost protection
to a lender when "state" intellectual property is turned into "fed-
eral" intellectual property For example, if the debtor offered as
collateral all her intellectual property, present and to be acquired
in the future, but had at the time of the loan only a valuable trade
secret that might later develop into a patent, a state U.C.C. filing
would perfect the lender's interest in the trade secret. If the lender
filed at the same time in the federal file as to "patents," and
extended the security interest to interests to be acquired in the
future,157 the lender would be protected as to the patent whenever
it issued. Under the present transaction system, a security interest
(perhaps taken by collateral assignment) in a patent is not possible
until the patent application is made, and once the patent issues the
value of the trade secret is eliminated. The monitoring and trans-
"' See supra note 3.
"' In addition to infringement liability, collateral assignees may have other responsi-
bilities such'as policing trademark licensees. See Mesrobian & Schaefer, supra note 3, at
839, 853. Concermng the difference between tide and a security interest, see supra notes
55-58 and accompanying text.
5 Although it might be a prudent practice, the U.C.C. does not require the financing
statement to state that after-acquired property is covered as long as the description of the
collateral by "type" describes .the collateral that is eventually claimed by the secured party.
See U.C.C. § 9-402, comment 2; James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l. Bank of Minneapolis,
194 N.W.2d 775, 783 (Minn. 1972) (Financing statement that referred to "construction
equipment, motor vehicles" was sufficient to perfect a security interest in property covered
by an extension agreement that gave a security interest in all goods "whether now owned
or hereinafter acquired."); In re Engle, 73 Bankr. 870, 872-73 (Bankr., E.D. Pa. 1987)
(security agreement contamng after-acquired property clause and financing statement refer-
ring to farm equipment were sufficient to give a security interest in after-acquired farm
equipment). See generally 1 G. GimmoR, supra note 29 § 11.6, at 354-59 (discussion of the
after-acquired property interest under Article 9); J. WEr & R. Summnps, supra note 98,
§ 22-6, at 986-87.
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action costs under the current system would be reduced by this
solution.
Additionally, notice filing makes relation-back periods unnec-
essary While the relation-back problem would not be entirely
solved by federal adoption of Article 9's notice filing system, 5 s the
problem would be substantially reduced and would make loans
available to debtors sooner. Since Article 9 files are probably easier
to maintain, shifting to the U.C.C. system could reduce the delay
between filing and indexing. This would improve the reliability of
the file, make financing more certain and available sooner, and
reduce its costs.
The new federal financing system and the U.C.C. system now
in place at the state level would be largely the same. 159 Those
lenders who lend on state property, including state intellectual
property and federal property, would confront few of the choice
of laws issues they now confront. The same or similar documents
would be demanded for both the state and federal property, and
even though an additional filing would be required for the state
property, filing as to both federal and state property would be the
same routine act.
'" The proposed changes unfortunately do not eliminate relation-back periods entirely.
For absolute transferees, the current system in the Patent and Trademark Office calls for
"assignment" of the patent or trademark and gives a 3 month relation-back period to allow
for transaction filing. See supra notes '124-28 and accompanying text. The authors have not
addressed this system through which purchasers and other non-financing transferees acquire
their interests.
The implications of treating only the f'mancing aspects of the problem are that under
this proposal a lender cannot be certain of the debtor's ownership interest until the relation-
back period plus any filing delay period within the Patent and Trademark Office have both
passed. This will obviously continue to impede prompt financing. Nonetheless, the lending
risk is reduced under this proposal because under an Article 9 regime other secured lenders
would not have the benefit of a relation-back period. Additionally, only "new" lenders will
confront this problem. Once a financing statement is in place, it will (under current U.C.C.
rules) defeat later transferees without regard to the relation-back period.
To eliminate a relation-back period entirely might require the adoption of a notice
system even for absolute transfers. If the federal file will continue to serve the function of
keeping track of owners of intellectual property, some transaction flung system may be
necessary. It remains to be seen whether a system can be devised that allows the federal
file to continue performing this function while, at the same time, eliminating the relation-
back period. It should be obvious that shortemng the period and eliminating delay in the
Patent and Trademark Office would be helpful.
110 While we suggest a number of changes to a federal text to better accommodate
secured lending on intellectual property, see infra notes 194-336 and accompanying text, the
basic structure, vocabulary, and conceptual approach will remain the same. In addition,
many of these changes we suggest may be incorporated into a new Article 9 thereby further
reducing differences.
KENTuCKY LAW JOURNAL
B. Costs
The projected benefits suggested above will never be quantifi-
able with any precision. Some of the costs may be more susceptible
to estimation; the question for policy makers will be whether the
proposed change costs more than it is worth.
1. Costs for Taxpayers
Perhaps the easiest costs to consider are the start-up costs in
establishing and maintaining the new filing system. The cost of
establishing a new filing system specifically designed to receive and
maintain financing statements covering patents and trademarks
would seem relatively modest.
Even the modest costs of putting a new system into place should
not be viewed in a vacuum. Maintaining U C.C. files of financing
statements covering patents and trademarks may be less expensive
than maintaining the older Patent and Trademark Office files,
some of which the newer files would replace. Any savings could
eventually offset whatever startup costs were involved in establish-
ing the new office. Moreover, with the proliferation of computers,
the task of keeping track of security interests has become much
easier. 16 If the new system is fully computerized, much of the
expense now implicit in searching, indexing, and maintaining tra-
ditional U C.C. files1 61 could be reduced.
2. Costs for Lenders and Persons Who Primarily Use the
Patent and Trademark Office Files
As suggested earlier, 162 it seems unlikely that many lenders deal
solely with the federal file. However, potential buyers of intellectual
property do work primarily with the federal file. As this proposal
16* Louisiana adopted Article 9 effective January 1, 1990. 1989 La. ACT 135; 1989
La. SB 879. Among that state's innovations is a computerized statewide filing system. The
system allows secured parties to perform searches and file financing statements in any of
64 parish offices without regard to location of the debtor. From any local office, one can
find a financing statement that was filed anywhere else. This system, made possible through
computerization, has eliminated from secured lending many of the troublesome where-to-
file questions and thereby made it less expensive and risky.
161 See supra note 148.
162 See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
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affects all those who use the federal system, 63 one, must consider
the impact of the proposal on these "outsiders" to financing who
will be confronted with the new system.
The proposed new system requires those persons who now
search for and acquire information through the Patent and Trade-
mark Office to take an additional step-check with the nearby
federal U.C.C. office under the name of the debtor. 164 Although
tins step adds some expense, it would appear minmal when com-
pared to the expenses a potential transferee or lender normally
sustains in assessing risk within the Patent and Trademark Office.
As discussed earlier, 165 a prospective purchaser or a lender wishing
to rely on a patent or trademark as collateral has to confirm that
the debtor has a current interest in it, that it does not infringe
another patent or trademark, and that it is otherwise valid. These
expenses are endemic to employing federal intellectual property as
collateral and continue whether the current secured financing re-
gime is changed or not. Under the new regime, potential transferees
and lenders would have to accurately determine the name of the
debtor and run a search in the federal U.C.C. office under that
name. The costs of an additional U.C.C. search seem negligible.
1
66
A change from the transaction system for lending to a notice
system arguably could impose other new costs. Because the pro-
posed system is a U C.C. notice filing system, the U.C.C. files
themselves would not reveal whether the patent or trademark ac-
tually was subject to a valid security interest. If a financing state-
ment was discovered, the potential transferee would have to inquire
further to determine if the debtor had encumbered the property it
was now proposing to sell or offer as collateral. 67 For those who
conceive of a file's function as defimtively establishing ownership
1, The underlying assumption here is that it is desirable as a policy matter to have a
perfected security interest in a patent or trademark defeat a later buyer. That policy choice,
although 6urrently part of both federal and state law, is probably sound but should be
examined in any large-scale codification of the law governing federal intellectual property
financing. For a discussion of some of the issues see infra notes 275-336 and accompanying
text.
' An efficient, well thought-out plan would enable searchers to trigger searches of
both files with one search request.
"7 See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
," Indeed, the improvement in certainty that would follow the elirmnation of the
relation-back period for financing searches might well offset the additional effort.
"7 U.C.C. § 9-208 requires the secured party to give information about the secured
transaction only in response to a request from the debtor. Given a shift from a transaction
system to a notice system envisioned by this proposal, policy makers might consider making
information from the secured party more readily available.
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and the extent of competing interests in property, a notice filing
system would be unsettling.
If the change is viewed in its real-world context, it seems less
problematic. Even now the single federal file does not definitively
determine all the issues important in assessing the value of a patent
or trademark. For example, the file does not reveal the amount of
debt remaimng that once supported a collateral assignment. 168 More
importantly, the file does not give conclusions about validity and
potential infringement. As is true under the U.C.C. system, a
searcher in the current federal system begins with the file; after
further risk assessment from investigation outside the file, a lender
or purchaser comes to a judgment that is subject to some risk of
error. The fact that the two federal files under the proposal seem
to contain less actual information than is present in the current
federal file is a cost, but when viewed against the substantial gaps
in information implicit in the current federal system, the decrease
in information seems small.
Similarly, the system as proposed will require those who now
take security interests and file in the current federal office to file
in a different physical location. During the transition phase, some
secured parties would continue to use assignment forms and file
them in the old office. Under the proposal, they would be required
to file in the "new" office if they wished to obtain priority pro-
tection. While filing in a different office might be viewed as a cost,
the simplified filing regime easily ought to offset this inconven-
ience.
3. Costs for Those Who Now Deal Primarily With State Offices
Earlier, 169 a paradigm secured party was- constructed, who took
a security interest in all the debtor's personal property including
patents and trademarks. That lender operated primarily with "state"
collateral and might view a visit to the Patent and Trademark
Office to perfect a security interest as a significantly increased
transaction cost. But unless the patents and trademarks were a
truly insignificant part of the collateral, a visit to the federal office
was likely in order to assess the value of the collateral. A federal
filing is a relatively small addition for those creditors that had to
go to the Patent and Trademark Office anyway.
168 See I GiLMoRE, supra note 29, § 15.2, at 470.
,69 See supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
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There was an additional omission from the paradigm that is
important here. Secured parties in larger transactions often deal
with more than one state office. The Article 9 filing rules have
enough play in them to prompt cautionary searches and filings by
most lenders m any sizeable transactions. The low cost of filing
and searching no doubt makes this a cost-effective practice.
In addition, if the collateral for a loan is "mixed," that is, if
it consists of tangible and intangible personal property in various
U.C.C. categories, multiple searches and filings may be required
by Article 9.170 In any transaction m which tangible collateral is
located in more than one state, the U.C.C. usually will require a
filing in all states where most forms of that collateral are located7
and in the state of the debtor's location for intangible'property1 72
Even where everything is located in a single state, filings in a
central state office, county offices, or both may be required. 7 3
As suggested earlier, requiring a secured party under the exist-
mg federal system to make a federal filing in the Patent and
Trademark Office can entail significant cost because of the differ-
ent documents and procedures implicated. By contrast, to require
a U.C.C.-onented secured party to make an additional U.C.C.
filing under the proposed system adds almost nothing to the costs
of the transaction. If the new system permitted filing by distant
computer or by mail, the additional costs imposed on secured
parties would be trifling.
4. Costs of Change
As persons learn to cope with the new system, transition costs
will be sustained. Those with little understanding of Article 9 would
have to learn enough to cope with an office using U.C.C. proce-
dures. Yet when compared to the alternative of requiring the
financing community to learn to cope with the current Patent and
Trademark Office approach, the transition costs will be insubstan-
110 The U.C.C. contains at least seven categories for collateral. See U.C.C. §§ 9-
103(3)(2), 9-105, 9-106, 9-109. The state of filing and the place within a state for filing can
differ with the category. See U.C.C. §§ 9-103, 9-401. This multiplicity of files continues to
cause problems for users of the file. See Cat.A, supra note 148 at 2-167 - 2-168.
171 Mobile goods are, however, treated as intangibles by the U.C.C., and the statute
fixes the place for filing as to that collateral at the location of the debtor, not in the states
where the goods are located. U.C.C. § 9-103(3).
"7 See id.
- See U.C.C. § 9-401.
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tial. Article 9 is not easy to master, but the U.C.C. was designed
from the ground up, and little within it is out of harmony with
the whole. Moreover, mastery is not required to comply with its
filing demands. 7 4
Since one would need to give some effect to filings that existed
under the old systems on the day of enactment, transition problems
would arise. But this will be a problem with any solution that
changes the current legal regime into an exclusive federal system.
A transition period is one obvious solution.
C. Federalism, Supremacy, and Uniformity Problems
The tenets of this two-part alternative are establishing a federal
filing office for security interests in patents and trademarks and
enacting a version of Article 9, as modified by Congress to reflect
federal policy,' 75 which will become the federal law applicable to
security interests m patents and trademarks. The benefits are a
system specifically designed for secured lending and less friction
with the system applicable to secured lending not involving patents
or trademarks.
One objection to this variation is that this alternative will
"federalize" commercial law, and such efforts should be resisted.
Although calls for federal enactment of a code of commercial law
have been made, 7 6 this proposal is not one of them. Rather, this
alternative simply suggests application-as federal law-of a system
for secured financing that is far superior to the uncertain current
law. 7 7 Just because state law serves as a model for new federal
law in an area that federal law has always played a significant role
does not mean that state commercial law is being "federalized."
" No doubt many of the persons from financial institutions that file U.C.C.-I's have
little understanding of the implications of their efforts. Grant Gilmore said that "taking a
personal property security interest should be made as simple and easy as rolling off a log."
Gilmore, Security Law, Formalism, and Article 9, 47 NEB. L. REv. 659, 668 (1968).
175 See infra notes 194-336 and accompanying text.
116 See Braucher, Federal Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAw &
CoNTEmp. PROBS. 100 (1951); Schnader, The Uniform Commercial Code - Today and
Tomorrow, 22 Bus. LAw. 229, 231 (1966). Professor Ray D. Henson once said that "Federal
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code will become a necessity if various states persist
in adopting peculiar local variations." Kennedy, Federalism and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 29 Bus. LAW. 1225, 1226 (1974); see also Taylor, Recent Developments in Commercial
Law, Forward: Federalism or Uniformity of Commercial Law, 11 RuT. CAM.. L.J. 527, 531
(1980); Taylor, Uniformity of Commercial Law and State-by-State Enactment: A Confluence
of Contradictions, 30 HAsrmos L.J. 337, 361-63 (1978).
I" See supra note 3.
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On the other hand, Otto Fabric and In re Transportation
Design have given some effect to state law in this area,178 and this
alternative would, in effect, reverse those cases in the interests of
predictability and ease of application. This implies a shift in the
law that controls federal intellectual property towards federal con-
trol. However, most obvious state law alternatives suffer from
policy objections that render them far less desirable.
7 9
Additionally, state control implies state-to-state variation. This
aspect of federalism may often be a good thing inasmuch as smaller
governments are thought to respond better to different regional
problems. But in this area, the lack of commercial law uniformity-
the diversity-that helps justify federalism"0 becomes an additional
factor in considering whether both parts of a "federal" solution
are attractive.
This alternative would use as a benchmark the 1989 Official
Text of the U.C.C. because no enacted, uniform U.C.C. exists
that the federal law could incorporate in whole or in part. Most
states have engrafted non-uniform amendments to the Code, and
state courts differ in their interpretation of their Uniform Com-
mercial Codes. For example, nearly 20 years after the 1972 Amend-
ments to Article 9 were unveiled, one state is still working with
the 1962 version of Article 9.181 The federal law govermng federal
intellectual property, on the other hand, has purported to be um-
form national law since its inception. A solution that would result
in appreciably less uniformity of the federal law in this area is not
to be encouraged.
Perhaps the most serious objection to federal enactment of a
version of Article 9 is the complexity that would follow where the
federal Article 9 and the state Article 9 differed. It may be fair to
assume that federal intellectual property by itself is seldom taken
as collateral for a loan. It may be that a secured creditor interested
only in intellectual property will take both state and federal intel-
lectual property as collateral. It may also be that many lenders
who take security interests in federal intellectual property also
concurrently take security interests in non-intellectual personal
17s See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
179 See supra notes 131-44 and accompanying text.
10 See generally Kruppenberg & Woodward, Uniformity and Efficiency in the Uniform
Commercial Code: A Partial Research Agenda, 45 Bus. LAw. 2519 (1990).
M Vermont continues to use the 1962 version of Article 9. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A,
§§ 1-101 to 9-507 (1967).
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property. Thus, it seems nearly inevitable that, under a federal
Article 9, both state and federal law could apply to different parts
of the same transaction. If the applicable law differed, transaction
costs to untangle the complexity would follow
To avoid complexity Congress could establish the federal filing
office but defer to Article 9 as state law to control most other
questions as it did with the Federal Aviation Act.'1 Defernng to
state law on non-filing issues would eliminate conflict when state
and federal collateral were involved in the same transaction and
reduce complexity and costs. But while the Federal Aviation Act
model followed this approach, deference to state law is not well
suited to solving the problems implicated here.
Deferring to the current Article 9 as the applicable law for
federal intellectual property financing will not of itself be adequate.
Although the present Article 9 would be an improvement over the
current confusing mix of federal and state law, in many situations
Article 9 is difficult to apply to problems that likely will arise with
regularity. 1 3 Additionally, in several places Article 9 dictates dif-
ferent results from the results reached under current federal law
applicable to patents and trademarks. 184 Possibly the current Article
9's policy choices are all preferable to the federal law alternatives,
but if Congress disagreed, special federal legislation would be
passed to override selected parts of the 1989 Text.
The U.C.C.'s Permanent Editorial Board has begun a study of
Article 9. The problems of intellectual property financing are being
considered and the results of the study could eventually produce
an Article 9 that addressed the problems of intellectual property
financing-both state and federal-and resolved the current con-
flicts between federal and state law satisfactorily. This revision
process has great promise and makes a deference to state law model
more palatable. But the realities of the Uniform Commercial Code
revision and enactment process prompt the authors to favor a
federal solution despite the conflicts it might cause.
"1 49 U.S.C. app. § 1403 (1982). Even with such a solution, difficult problems
concerning the relationship between Article 9 and the federal registry will probably remain.
See generally Reiley, Preemption of Article 9 by the Federal Aviation Act: New Meaning
to "Buyer Beware", 18 U.C.C. L.J. 242 (1986); Sigman, The Wild Blue Yonder: Interests
in Aircraft Under Our Federal System, 46 S. CAL. L. Ray. 316 (1973).
I" See infra notes 290-323 and accompanying text (discussing priority contests among
perfected secured creditors and subsequent licensees).
- For example, the knowledge of a competing claimant can be determinative under
the federal scheme, whereas knowledge is irrelevant in determining most pnorities under
Article 9. See infra note 275-89 and accompanying text.
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If an Article 9 can be developed that adequately addresses the
issues of intellectual property financing, 1 5 that statute will differ
from the current Article and will be a long time coming. U.C.C.
reform entails a lengthy process of developing the statute followed
by a very time-consuming process of state by state enactment. In
the interim, either an inadequate Article 9 would govern everywhere
(prior to any adoption of the new statute) or the inadequate statute
will govern in some states and an improved statute will govern in
others. This lack of textual uniformity is probably inevitable.186
The policy questions are how much state law divergence from
federal law is likely under a federal solution, and whether the
undesirability of that divergence is outweighed by the gains in
intrastate uniformity that a state law solution would yield in those
cases where mixed transactions are involved. Although one might
tolerate the non-uniform state amendments and judicial interpre-
tations of state law in order to have the same law applied to all
parts of the same transaction, the slow, incremental process of
making the text of a new Article 9 into state law presents a
substantial obstacle to a state-law option. If history is to be any
guide, it may be 20 years following promulgation before states are
even working with the same text of a new Article 9.
A federal text for federal intellectual property financing solves
the problem of interstate variation because the federal text becomes
the law in all states at enactment. However, the law to be applied
I" An optimal set of rules for intellectual property financing could conceivably differ
from the optimal set of rules one might develop for other kinds of personal property
financing. If this turned out to be the case, there would be several alternatives available for
reformers. They could choose one set of rules and thereby sacrifice optimal results m one
area in the interest of statutory sunplicity. They could make a more complex Article 9 by
adding special rules for intellectual property collateral. Or, if the differences for intellectual
property financing were extensive enough, they could develop a whole new statute to treat
only intellectual property financing. The authors tunk that intellectual property financing
generally may require some (perhaps many) special rules; the authors do not know whether
federal intellectual property has characteristics that make it unsuitable for treatment with
intellectual property generally. If financing based on federal and state intellectual property
can be well served by the same rules, a federal text developed solely for federal intellectual
property could (in an odd reversal of federalism) serve as a model for state rules to govern
non-federal intellectual property generally.
I" Even if the law were exclusively federal, that would not guarantee uniform treatment
of security interests in federal intellectual property. A vast array of state law issues could
arise in connection with any such financing, and where the law on those issues differed
from state to state, so might the intellectual property financing. Major areas such as contract
formation and capacity to contract will probably always be governed by state law, and to
that extent, practitioners will have to address choice of law questions and look outside the
federal law for guidance.
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to a "mixed" transaction will be particularly troublesome in those
states where an old Article 9 governs part of the transaction and
a new federal Article 9 governs the rest. The trade-off seems to be
national uniformity in the law governing federal intellectual prop-
erty versus local uniformity in the law governing a single mixed
transaction. How would one choose between the two approaches?
187
It may not be enough simply to assert that federal law govern-
ing patents and trademarks must be "uniform" and that the state
law solution would undercut uniformity 188 Uniformity, after all,
is only a goal and it can be compromised in the interests of higher
values. State law governing commercial transactions has a unifor-
mity goal as well, 8 9 but tls goal routinely yields to other values. 190
"8 There are other approaches that might be considered. Congress could reduce the
intrastate problems of different federal and state law being applied to the same transaction
by legislating that the Official Text of the revised Article 9 governs federal intellectual
property financing. This might be sensible if a new Article 9 addressed these types of
collateral and reformers made revisions to Article 9 that made policy sense to Congress. To
the extent that states were to enact the revised Official Text, they would reduce for their
citizens the conflict between their state law and the law that would apply to federal
intellectual property. At the same time, the same text would apply to federal intellectual
property in all jurisdictions. The authors know of no precedent for such a solution, and of
course, it resembles the main alternative the authors have been considering in. the text to
the extent that the Official Text developed by reformers and the federal text developed by
Congress resemble one another. A problem with this variation is that the Permanent
Editorial Board has only begun a study process; a revised Article 9 (if that is deemed called
for) is many years off.
Congress also could solve both the interstate non-uniformity problem and a large part
of the intrastate non-uniformity problem by legislating a regime to cover all intellectual
property financing, both federal and state, and establishing a filing office to receive financing
statements covenng all forms of intellectual property. If intellectual property financing is
an area with discrete problems and issues that call for different answers than other areas,
that is, if a separate statute for intellectual property generally is needed, this variant nght
be worth considering.
lu Although there should be a reason based in policy for demanding national unifor-
mity in federal intellectual property financing, one has a sense that inertia and rhetoric may
play a large role in deciding whether Congress will develop a new federal text to govern
federal intellectual property financing or whether, instead, Congress will explicitly defer to
state law. As suggested in the text, there may be good reasons for a state law solution to
the non-filing issues. But given the U.C.C. enactment process and the virtually certain lack
of national uniformity that will accompany a new Article 9 for several years, it could be
difficult for Congress to explain legislation directed to patents and trademarks that explicitly
deferred to individual state law, the contents of which Congress could not predict in advance.
Put another way, if Congress decided to act at all (which the authors believe it must in
order to clarify the uncertain relationship between federal and state law), it, might find it
politically troublesome to specifically defer to state law given the predictable, relatively
long-term lack of statutory uniformity such a decision would entail.
189 See U.C.C. § 1-102(l)(c).
110 See generally Kmppenberg & Woodward, supra note 180.
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In the area of federal intellectual property, uniformity may be
particularly important owing to the presence of non-lenders who
will be affected by the law governing federal intellectual property
financing. Under the tentative priority rules of the alternative we
have been considering, potential buyers will take their interests
subject to earlier perfected security interests as they now do under
the Patent and Lanham Acts. Those buyers must therefore confront
the law governing federal intellectual property financing.
Such buyers probably need not now consult state law to deter-
mine whether a purchase of intellectual property will be subject to
a state-filed security interest. 191 Requiring those persons, having
found a financing statement in the new federal U C.C. file, to
figure out which state law applies and determine the impact of
that particular state's law on their non-financing transaction injects
high costs into their transactions. But once again empirical facts
could bear on the problem; it may not make sense to decide what
is the optimal approach without finding out more about buyers of
federal intellectual property. If buyer transactions are not econom-
ically significant and would not become so under a different legal
regime,'9 we may not want to bottom a policy choice on their
interests.
Finally, although federal enactment of a version of Article 9
for financing with federal intellectual property might inject some
legal complexity where state and federal texts differ, it could con-
ceivably have a stabilizing effect on state U.C.C. law Courts would
be called upon to decide matters based on federal law that tracked
the U.C.C., and those decisions would be available by analogy in
addressing similar problems under state law. 93 To the extent a
' Buyers of federal intellectual property take subject to preexisting licenses, yet there
is no recording system now available to permit those potential buyers to independently
determine if the intellectual property they are buying is being conveyed with or without
preexisting licenses. The curious apparent ability of buyers to live with the status quo for
licenses suggests several possibilities: there might not be much trade in tins form of property,
trade in this property could be substantially different from trade in other personal property,
or the industry might have developed non-governmental means to more accurately ascertain
the risks. This surely underscores the need for better understanding of the actual business
practices in this field before deciding on the optimal solution.
"9 If buyers do not buy federal intellectual property very often, it could simply mean
that aspects of the current legal regime are such that it inhibits sales transactions whereas
a different legal regime might not.
"9 An issue raised by this variation is whether Federal Courts should have jurisdiction
over disputes related to federal intellectual property financing. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988)
currently gives Federal District Courts original jurisdiction of "any civil action arising under
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federal text and a revised Article 9 resembled one another, a federal
text also could improve the state enactment process and serve as a
constraint on the non-uniform amendment process: an outdated
Article 9 and non-uniform amendments would increase the com-
plexity in situations where both federal and state law applied to
different parts of the transaction.
V INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ARTICLE 9" TowARDS A
FEDERAL TEXT
The proposal contains two elements. First, security interests in
patents and federally registered trademarks would be perfected by
filing a federal financing statement in an office associated with the
Patent and Trademark Office. Second, the 1989 Official Text of
the Uniform Commercial Code, with appropriate amendments,
would be federally enacted to provide a comprehensive regulatory
scheme for these security interests, which states could not alter. 194
The proposed legislation is referred to as the "Federal Text." This
section considers for inclusion in the Federal Text amendments to
the 1989 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code that may
be appropriate to facilitate federal intellectual property financing.
Many of the amendments considered also would be appropriate
for a revised edition of the Official Text of Article 9 if Congress
fails to act or determines that state rather than federal law should
control security interests in patents and trademarks.
A. The Floating Lien
The 1989 U.C.C. Text validates the "floating lien," a consen-
sual security interest encumbering present and future assets as
any Act of Congress relating to patents, copyrights, and trademarks." This section has
received a narrow construction by a leading case in the financing area, Republic Pictures
Corp. v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 197 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1952), but surely policy makers
would want to address this issue to spare the courts the need to decide the matter. Whether
a need for more uniformity or some particular competence possessed by the federal courts
justifies federal jurisdiction here as a matter of policy is an issue we leave to others to
debate.
94 The authors propose federal enactment of enough of the 1989 Text to provide a
statutory framework for mteliectual property financing. Many provisions of Article 9 seem
clearly irrelevant for tlus purpose, and it would make sense to omit them from the legislation.
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-313 (security interests in fixtures). Many provisions which may be
suitable with some modification are discussed in this part. See infra notes 195-336 and
accompanying text. No doubt there are others. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-318. Additionally, an
implication of our proposal is that some sections from other Articles of the Code also
would be federally enacted. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (definition of security interest).
This Article concerns broad policy choices implicated in adapting Article 9 to this field; it
does not detail which sections of the U.C.C. should or should not be federally enacted.
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security for present and future obligations. 9 5 The lien stands on
three legs: an after-acquired property clause, 19 a future advance
clause,'9 and a provision permitting the security interest to attach
automatically to proceeds received by the debtor on the disposition
of original collateral. 98 This section discusses whether there is any
reason to limit the availability of the floating lien under the Federal
Text and, if not, whether the 1989 Text's floating lien machinery
is adequate for federal intellectual property financing.
1. Future Advance Clauses
The future advance clause permits a single security agreement
to secure a series of loans over time. Advances may be perfected
as soon as the secured party commits to them.'9 The priority of
each advance may date from a proper filing, which because of
notice filing, may occur at any time-even before execution of the
security agreement.m No apparent reason exists in the context of
intellectual property financing to alter the Code's future advance
apparatus. A debtor's patents and trademarks can be relatively
long-term assets. They should be available as collateral for a series
of credit extensions from the secured party without the transaction
costs imposed by multiple security agreements, financing state-
ments, and filings.
2. After-Acquired Property Clauses and "Purchase Money"
Lenders
A valid after-acquired property clause under the Federal Text
would permit a security interest to attach automatically to patents
or trademarks issued in the future as well as to those owned by
the debtor when the security agreement is executed. 2°" Assuming
the presence of a legally sufficient security agreement and value
given to the debtor, the security interest would attach to a future
I" See U.C.C. § 9-204, comment 2. See generally I GnmoRE, ,supra note 29, § 11.7,
at 359-60 (discussion of Article 9 security interests and the "floating lien").
U.C.C. § 9-204(1).
"' Id. § 9-204(3).
'" Id. § 9-203(3).
See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(44)(a), 9-105(1)(k), 9-203(1)(b), 9-303(1).
o See U.C.C. §§ 9-301(4), 9-307(3), 9-312(7), 9-402(1).
" An after-acquired property clause might extend to any reissue, division, continua-
tion, renewal, extension, or continuation in part, or improvement of any patent. See
Bramson, supra note 3, at 1600. Likewise, it might reach all the debtor's right, title and
interest in trademarks that the debtor may acquire in the future.
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asset at the moment the debtor obtains rights in it.2° Because of
notice filing, priority for all present and future collateral may date
from a single filing prior to execution of the security agreement. 203
No apparent reason peculiar to intellectual property financing
exists for limiting the clause's availability, and under current prac-
tice, one commentator recommended language similar to an after-
acquired property clause for collateral assignments. 2 4 But an un-
qualified endorsement of inclusion of the 1989 Text's after-acquired
property clause machinery in the Federal Text cannot be made
without first considering the rights of purchase money financers
seeking security in patents or trademarks.
Valid after-acquired property clauses permit a debtor to give
first priority in all present and future property to one lender
through an all-embracing security interest. At one time, these clauses
were viewed skeptically because they enabled a creditor to "mo-
nopolize" all the debtor's present and future personalty, making
it impossible for the debtor to obtain secured financing from other
sources. 20 5 The 1989 Text partially overcomes this problem by
providing that a creditor who enables the debtor to acquire new
assets may obtain a purchase money security interest in those assets
with priority over an earlier perfected security interest encumbering
after-acquired property.2°6 Unfortunately, application of this lim-
ited exception to the first lender's monopoly on financing is diffi-
cult in the context of intellectual property 207
Suppose that a debtor previously granted a security interest
covering all present and future trade secrets and patents to secured
See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(44), 9-110, 9-203(1), 9-303(1). The nature and timing of the
debtor's nghts in the collateral are defined by non-U.C.C. law and, in this case, may be
defined by federal intellectual property law.
-3 See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a).
10 See Bramson, supra note 3, at 1587. The 1989 Text's only limit on after-acquired
property clauses applies when the debtor is a consumer. See U.C.C. §§ 9-109(I), 9-204(2).
2 Critics were skeptical for other reasons as well. For example, it was thought that
the clause might harm unsecured creditors by depriving them of a cushion of free assets.
See U.C.C. §§ 9-204 comment 2; 9-312 comment 3. See generally I GILMoRi, supra note
29,. § 11.7, at 359 (reasons why this aspect of Article 9 is its most controversial feature).
- See U.C.C. §§ 9-107, 9-204 comment 5; 9-312(3)-(4). The purchase money priority
also may be explained as a means to reduce transaction and monitoring costs. Jackson &
Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1168-69
(1979).
m The Code's original drafters may have believed that purchase money security inter-
ests in general intangibles such as patents or federally registered trademarks were unlikely.
See 2 G. GIuMoRE supra note 29, at § 29.5; Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76
HARv L. Ray. 1333, 1372 (1962-63) (it is almost impossible to conceive of a situation in
which intangible money claims could be made the subject of a purchase money transaction).
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party A. The debtor wisfies to develop a new patentable technology
and s~cured creditor B is willing to provide all necessary financing
provided that it will have priority over A. One source of difficulty
is that under the 1989 Text it is necessary for B to obtain "purchase
money" status in order to have priority over A.M8 This requires B
to show that it gave value "to enable the debtor to acquire rights
in or the use of" the new technology and that the value was "in
fact so used." How could B show this m the context of a debtor's
developing intellectual property?210 The enabling and tracing re-
quirements may be difficult to satisfy if the debtor employed
resources from any other internal or external source to finance the
development of the technology. Tracing may be impossible unless
secured party B closely monitors the debtor's use of the loan
proceeds. If the availability of purchase money priority is or could
bell important in the context of intellectual property financing and
the 1989 Text's enabling and tracing burdens seem unworkable,
21 2
then reducing these burdens through appropriate amendments in-
corporated into the Federal Text may be appropriate.21 Perhaps it
should be enough that the loan transaction is closely allied with
the debtor's development of the new intellectual property. The
See U.C.C. § 9-312(4).
20 U.C.C. § 9-107(b) ("A security interest is a 'purchase money security interest' to
the extent that it is taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an
obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if
such value is in fact so used."). A person who sells the asset to the debtor must show that
the security interest was taken "to secure all or part of its price " Id. § 9-107(a).
210 The same problem also may arise in connection with trade secrets or other state
intellectual property. Article 9's language also poses problems for the financer in a somewhat
analogous situation, that in which a buyer finances the encumbered debtor's production of
new goods. See Jackson & Kronman, A Plea for the Financing Buyer, 85 YAM L.J. 1
(1975).
-" Cf. supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
222 The enabling and tracing requirements are not always difficult. For example, sup-
pose that a person wishes to borrow funds in order to become the assignee of a patent and
gives the financer a security interest in the patent. The creditor might establish both
requirements by making the loan check payable to the assignor.
There are at least three methods for a lender to avoid the need for purchase money
standing altogether: (1) make a large enough loan to pay off the prior creditor protected
by the after-acquired property clause, (2) negotiate a subordination agreement with the prior
creditor (see U.C.C. § 9-316), and (3) loan at the unsecured interest rate.
223 The purchase money standing requirements, see supra note 209, have frustrated
attempts to claim purchase money priority in intangible assets. See, e.g., MBank Alamo
Nat'l. Assoc. v. Raytheon Co., 886 F.2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1989); In re Woodworks Contem-
porary Furniture, Inc., 44 Bankr. 971, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1842 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1984).
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purchase money concept was not intended to require "rigid adher-
ence to particular formalities and sequences.
'214
The second difficulty for lenders seeking purchase money pn-
ority in intellectual property is the 1989 Text's requirement that
the interest be perfected at the time the debtor receives possession
of the collateral or within ten days thereafter. 215 Patents and trade-
marks, unlike "pledgeable" intangibles such as negotiable instru-
ments, are not reified. Therefore, they are incapable of being
possessed in the Code's intended sense of that term, which requires
physical delivery to the debtor.216 For example, when does a debtor
"possess" a patent? Is it when the debtor has paid the appropriate
fee and met all other requirements for issuance of the patent, when
the patent document is delivered by the Patent and Trademark
Office, or at some other time?217 Since an ambiguous answer will
raise the costs of lending, this may be another area for clarification
in the Federal Text. The same. problem arises in connection with
state intellectual property such as trade secrets and state trade-
marks, which also are not reified.
If purchase-money priority is unworkable m the context of
intellectual property, the question becomes whether an unlimited
after-acquired property clause that enables the first lender to mo-
nopolize the debtor's secured lending is a good idea, and if not,
what limits are appropriate. 218 More detailed analysis of these ques-
tions is not within the scope of this Article.
214 MBank Alamo, 886 F.2d 1449 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 G. GILMoRE,
supra note 29, at 782); see also Jackson & Kronman, supra, note 210 (an analysis and
proposal concerning a somewhat analogous problem with the enabling and tracing require-
ments).
21 One commentator suggests that if a secured party wants a purchase money security
interest m intangibles, then the finance transaction should be "documented" in order to
satisfy the 10-day rule. B. Cx.Ac, supra note 148, 3.09(2)(b).
216 See, e.g., Gold Medal Prods., Inc. v. Love Enters., Inc., 766 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1989) (under Article 9 it is impossible to perfect a security interest in a general
intangible such as a patent by possession); see Wellsville Bank v. Nicolay, 33 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 72 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982) (possession of a document describing nonreified intangible
rights such as those under a patent or trademark would not amount to possession of the
rights themselves); cf. In re Information Exch., Inc., 98 Bankr. 603, 604-05, 8 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv.2d 823, 825 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (possession of computer tapes insufficient to
perfect a security interest in the program and data base on the tape). See 2 G. GIusoR,
supra note 29, § 29.3, at 787, § 29.5, at 799; B. CLARK, supra note 148, 3.09(4)(a), (c).
217 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.315 (1989). See generally 4 E. Lpscoma3, supra note 39, at §
12.64 (allowance and issue).
2,- For example, Article 9 places partial limits on the after-acquired property clause in
the case of consumer goods. See U.C.C. § 9-204(2).
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3. Proceeds
The 1989 Text provides that a security interest continues in any
identifiable proceeds received by the debtor. 21 9 'Proceeds' includes
whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, . . or other dispo-
sition of collateral or proceeds." As a general proposition, any
personalty that might fall under this definition and be identified
(i.e., traced) also can be easily encumbered as original collateral
under an after-acquired property clause. 1 For example, a creditor
might include "all future patents" in a security agreement because
the creditor anticipates that the debtor may eventually exchange its
existing patent for a different one, and the creditor wishes to have
a security interest in the new patent. Even though one can achieve
such results by careful drafting, good reasons exist for having a
security interest attach automatically to proceeds in addition to
permitting a broad after-acquired property clause.
First, the proceeds claim can provide a second "bite at the
apple," which may be important if some insufficiency in the after-
acquired property clause exists.m More importantly, under federal
bankruptcy law a secured claim to proceeds might be employed
successfully to recover a patent or trademark acquired by the
debtor's estate after the filing of a bankruptcy petition, whereas
an after-acquired property claim would be ineffective for this pur-
pose.2 The Bankruptcy Code provides that if a prepetition security
agreement extends to proceeds, the terms of the security agreement
and "applicable nonbankruptcy law" such as Article 9 will be
enforced against postpetition proceeds. 4 If, as a policy matter,
proceeds claims in or out of bankruptcy are important in the
context of intellectual property financing, the 1989 Text's definition
of proceeds may be insufficient.
The degree of inadequacy of the 1989 Text can be illustrated
through some examples where the original collateral is a patent
21 U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
Id. § 9-306(l).
22 But see U.C.C. § 9-104.
2 Intellectual property financers currently include an after-acquired property clause
in their assignment documents. See Bramson, supra note 3, at 1599 - 1600 (example of a
patent collateral agreement).
2 See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a)-(b) (1989).
The security interest may extend to "proceeds, products, rents, or profits" of
prepetition collateral, and a secured party's recovery may be limited by the "equities of the
case." Id. § 552(b). See generally 4 COTmTR oN BAxulTrcy 552.01-.02 (15th ed. 1990)
(general rule of § 552(a) and (b)).
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
that the debtor exchanges for something else. If the debtor gets a
check or cash from an assignee upon assigning the patent, both
check and cash seem to fit comfortably within the 1989 Text's
definition of proceeds and would be subject to the secured party's
security interest. If the debtor licenses the patent to a third party
in return for royalty payments, the situation is less clear. The right
to receive royalties and the royalty income stream can be viewed
as resulting from the debtor's "disposition" of rights from the
bundle of rights represented by the patent.2 26 Under this view, the
debtor's right to receive payment, formalized by the license and
satisfied by the royalties, fits the definition of proceeds in the 1989
Text.? 7 An analogy is the sale of one good from an inventory of
goods securing a loan. The debtor's right to payment may be
reflected in a sales agreement, which is analogous to the license,
and ultimately results in payment by the purchaser, which is anal-
ogous to the royalties.
However, the royalties might be thought of as payments for
immunity from patent infringement o- for the sharing of patent
rights. Intellectual property law may support this approach,22 which
could lead to the conclusion that no "disposition of collateral"
has occurred and that the royalties are not proceeds within the
definition. Article 9 case law provides analogical support for this
view For example, payments received from users of collateral
consisting of commercial video game machines has been held not
to constitute proceeds because the payments were for the use of
- In the case of cash proceeds such as money or checks, restitutionary or trust tracing
pnnciples may be employed to identify proceeds out of bankruptcy. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1)-
(2); Umversal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank of Portageville, 358 F Supp. 317 (E.D.
Mo. 1973). In bankruptcy, the secured party's recovery is defined by U.C.C. § 9-306(4).
See generally Weinberg, The Malformed Mouse Meets the LIBR: Secured and Restitutionary
Claims to Commingled Funds, 8 ANN. REv. BANio LAW 269 (1989) (analysis of recovery
of funds subject to a security interest in or out of bankruptcy).
26 See supra notes 35-53 and accompanying text. The rights disposed of by the debtor
may remain subject to the security interest. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2). See generally infra notes
295-96 and accompanying text.
2" The security interest continues in any identifiable proceeds "received" by the debtor.
The term "received" should not require the taking of physial possession; rights under the
license may be received when the license agreement is executed even though the rights are
not reified. See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
569 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Linders Card Shop, Inc., 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 575 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1979). See generally R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNrFoRM
COMMERCIAL CODE 196 {2d ed. 1979) (security interest in proceeds).
See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
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the collateral rather than from its sale.229 Although the authors
think that the royalties ought to be considered "proceeds," 230 the
1989 Text does not resolve this important ambiguity. Perhaps the
Federal Text should and, in addition, the group conmssioned by
the Permanent Editorial Board of the U.C.C. to study Article 9
should consider the issue more broadly in the revision process.
Another proceeds-related problem for intellectual property fi-
nancing arises when rights under a patent serving as collateral are
infringed. Federal law gives the mortgagee of a patent the exclusive
right to prosecute a patent infringement, 231 in effect, extending the
security interest to the infringement action. Would the cause of
action for patent infnngement be "proceeds" of the patent under
the 1989 Official Text? Possibly not for two reasons. First, causes
of action for patent and trademark infringement have been char-
acterized as torts,232 and Article 9 does not apply to transfers of
tort claims. 233 Second, the Article's defintion of proceeds has been
interpreted to require a voluntary disposition of collateral and,
therefore, not to cover assets such as a debtor's claim against a
2" In re S & J Holding Corp., 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 668, 669 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984);
see In re A.E.I. Corp., 11 Bankr. 97, 102, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1467, 1470 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa 1981) (security interest in machinery and proceeds did not extend to rental payments
from lease of the machinery).
2" Under intellectual property law, a license of patent rights may differ from an
assignment of patent rights in that only the latter transaction is thought of as involving a
transfer of "property" rights. See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text. In substance,
however, the two transaction types are alternate means to exploiting the economic value of
a patent. See G. SmrIH & R. PARR, supra note 37, at 174-76. The value of a patent is
established in the market, where it may compete with substitute patented or unpatented
goods or processes. See Easterbrook, supra note 33, at 109. Income streams obtained by
assignment or license represent a realization of the potential value held by the collateral
prior to the transaction, and as such each income stream should constitute proceeds. See
generally R. Haim", J. McDoEU., & S. Nicanas, COMMON LAW AND EQuTY UNDER
Tm UIroRM COMMERCIAL CODE 22.05(1)(a) (1985) (broad definition of proceeds).
"I Tis nght belongs to the patent's owner. See Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S.
252 (1890).
23 Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931) (patent
infringement, "whether direct or contributory, is essentially a tort."). See 2 J. McCATHY,
supra note 3, § 25:3 ("Trademark infringement and unfair competition are torts."); RE-
sTATEMENT or TORTs § 757 (1938) (liability for improper disclosure or use of trade secrets
also sounds in tort).
"I U.C.C. § 9-104(k) (Article 9 does not apply "to a transfer in whole or in part of
any claim arising out of tort."); see also § 9-104(h) (Article 9 does not apply "to a right
represented by a judgment (other than a judgment taken on a right to payment which was
collateral)"). Claims for past and future patent infringement are assignable subject to certain
limits or qualifications imposed by patent law. See generally E. Ln'scOMB, supra note 39, §
19:17 (assignment of rights of action for past infringements).
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tortfeasor who damages goods subject to a security interest .34 If
infringement actions as "proceeds" are important to intellectual
property financers,2 35 then appropriate amendments should be in-
cluded in the Federal Text.2 6 Similarly, since Article 9 treats non-
federal intellectual property, revisions to Article 9 itself might be
necessary.
2
3
7
The insufficiency of the 1989 Text's definition of proceeds may
not be limited to cases in wich the concern is with proceeds of
patents or trademarks. A creditor might wish to assert a proceeds
claim to these patents or trademarks. A lender taking a security
interest in a patent application may wish to claim the resulting
patent as proceeds. Authority exists that a patent is not proceeds
of a patent application, apparently for lack of a "disposition" of
the application by the debtor.Y8 Other issues include whether im-
provement or reissue patents would be proceeds of the original
patent under the 1989 Text.239
23 See, e.g., In re Boyd, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 669, 675 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1983) (amOunt
payable to debtor by insurer in settlement of debtor's claim in tort against the insured was
not "proceeds"). In 1972 the Official Text of U.C.C. § 9-306(1) was amended to specify
that "insurance payable by reason of loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds except to
the extent it is payable to a person other than a party to the security agreement." Permanent
-Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code, Final Report at 94-95 (1971). This
amendment may imply that involuntary dispositions can generate proceeds. See, e.g., In re
Stone, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1465, 1469 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (funds generated from tort
claim settlement involving property that was collateral for secured debt constituted proceeds);
see also Baldwin v. Manna City Properties, Inc., 79 Cal. App.3d 393, 403 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978) (a secured party may have her own tort cause of action for impairment of the security
interest).
231 This may be the case given the approach federal law has taken to standing to sue
for patent infringement. See supra note 231.
2m Amendments to the 1989 Text also would be required to bring security interests in
infringement actions within the scope of the statute. See supra notes 232-33 and accompa-
nying text.
Similarly, policymakers would want to consider the other implication of the federal
approach, viz, that the debtor has no standing to sue for infringement. The 1989 Text
would probably reverse this view implicitly. Cf. U.C.C. '§§ 9-205, 9-311, 9-317.
2" The proceeds issue is broader still. Tort claims are presently excluded from Article
9. See U.C.C. § 9-104(k). Yet an action against a third party for conversion of or damage
to the collateral might properly be regarded as "proceeds" of the collateral. See id. § 9-
306(1); supra note 234 and accompanying text. Revision of the tort claims exclusion might
be in order.
238 See In re Transportation Design & Tech., Inc., 48 Bankr. 635, 641 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1985) ("'Proceeds' anse when the collateral is sold or in some way disposed of.").
239 An analysis also.nught be made of other patent-related assets (e.g., continuations-
in-part, extensions, etc.), which are routinely assigned in collateral assignments. See Brain-
son, supra note 3, at 1599.
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A patent covering improvements probably is not proceeds of
the original patent because no "disposition" of the original occurs,
and patent law requires that the improvement patent be new,
useful, and nonobvious in its own right. Even if the term pro-
ceeds is defined broadly, the improvement patent is not a substitute
for the original patent and thus is not proceeds.24 Reissue is a
procedure to correct an error made without deceptive intent that
causes a patent to be wholly or partly invalid or inoperative.u2 The
original patent must be surrendered to obtain a reissue patent, the
term of the reissue patent is the balance of the term of the original.
patent,2" and the reissue patent must be for the same invention as
the original.2 All this suggests that the reissue patent is received
upon disposition of the original patent, is a' substitute for it, and
is proceeds. The reissue patent might enlarge the scope of the
original claims, but these are the boundaries that the original would
have had absent the error.
Whether or not the outcomes suggested by the 1989 Text are
sound from a policy standpoint, the Federal Text could be im-
proved to reduce uncertainty concerning the proceeds issues dis-
cussed above. Going even further may be advisable. For example,
does a security interest in "trade secrets and proceeds" reach a
patent disclosing an invention that was the subject of a trade
secret?24 Under the 1989 Text, arguably it does. To obtain the
patent, the debtor exchanges the protection of state trade secret
law for federal patent protection that is conditioned upon public
disclosure of the invention or process.? This exchange is implicitly
recognized by the Patent Act, which requires the Patent and Trade-
'- See 35 U.S.C. § 101. See generally CASES AND MATmums, supra note 41, at 525-
26 (discussion of improvements).
21 See R. Hamus., J. McDoNN-nq, & S. NicKLBs, supra note 230.
See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1989).
-3' See 35 U.S.C. §§ 251-252 (1989). See generally CAsEs AND MATmEAtS, supra note
41, at 549-50 (discussion of reissue).
74 See generally 4 E. Lipscom , supra note 39, § 14:15 (No new matter shall be
introduced in an application for reissue.).
21 A trade secret may serve as collateral under Article 9 and is characterized as a
general intangible. See U.C.C. §§ 9-102(1), 9-106. However, a cause of action for violation
of trade secret rights sounds in tort and is excluded from the scope of Article 9. See supra
notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
- See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1989). This trade-off does not always favor a decision to
obtain the patent. See generally Epstein & Levi, Protecting Trade Secret Information: A
Plan for Proactive Strategy, 43 Bus. LAW. 887, 887888 (1988) (protection of trade secret
information compared to patent protection).
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mark Office to keep pending patent applications in confidence.Y7
However, on further examination, this argument may not be
persuasive. The patent might be viewed as much more than a simple
substitute for the trade secret because trade secrets are qualitatively
different from patents. Trade secret rights arise merely by creating
the trade secret; they give no protection against persons who in-
dependently develop the same invention or process, and can expire
for lack of sufficient efforts to maintain secrecy. Patents repre-
sent a significantly different cluster of rights. They are obtained
after a costly prosecution process and afford a statutory monopoly,
for a limited period, on the right to make, use, or sell the patented
process or invention.2 9 The patent seems more a "new develop-
ment" than "proceeds" as defined by the 1989 Text. Although
under a federal text the secured party could file against the debtor's
present and future patents, there are bankruptcy implications of
categorizing new developments "proceeds" instead of "after-ac-
quired property." 0 Thus, policy makers might consider whether
the definition of proceeds should be expanded to cover new devel-
opments.25
B. Perfection Other Than by Federal Filing
The authors have proposed that filing in the Patent and Trade-
mark Office be the method for perfecting security interests in
patents and federally registered trademarks. Should perfection by
possession or automatic perfection (i.e., perfection with neither
filing nor possession by the secured party) also be available under
the Federal Text? Should state filings ever be sufficient to perfect
a security interest under the Federal Text?
Perfection by possession or automatic perfection would not
become available merely by federally enacting the 1989 Text. The
1989 Text characterizes patents and trademarks as "general intan-
gibles," for which filing is virtually the only available means of
', 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1989).
See REsTATEmENr OF ToRTs § 757 comment a (1938). The RESTATEMENT 2D OF
TORTS did not include trade secret law, leaving the original Restatement as the most
authoritative statement on trade secret law. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act is generally in
accord with the first Restatement of Torts. See UNIoFR TRADE SEcRETs ACT §§ 1-12
(1980). See generally CAsEs AND MATERLAis, supra note 41, at 8 (general discussion).
uA For example, in the case of utility patents the term is 17 years. 35 U.S.C. § 154
(1989).
2" See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
"I See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 3, at 226 (this solution is suggested).
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perfection. 252 Under the 1989 Text, perfecting security interests in
general intangibles by possession is impossible,2 3 which seems en-
tirely appropriate given the nonpledgeable character of patents and
trademarks. 254 With a few exceptions, under the 1989 Text obtain-
ing an automatically perfected security interest in general intangi-
bles is impossible, and most of the exceptions would not apply to
patents or trademarks.
255
Automatic perfection would be available under the Federal Text
if Congress specially provided for it. Congress also could give
federal effect to proper state filings. Are there good reasons for
Congress to do so"
Patents and trademarks are part of a broad spectrum of state
and federal intellectual property rights, all of which might serve as
collateral for a loan. For example, suppose a secured party takes
a security interest in the debtor's general intangibles including all
trade secrets and patents, and files only in the appropriate state
office. Unknown to the secured party, the debtor subsequently
obtains a patent on technology that had been trade secret collat-
eral. 256 If the Federal Text provides for federal filing as the sole
means of perfection, the security interest in the patent would be
unperfected because of the lack of a federal filing even though the
trade secret rights "metamorphosed" into the patent rights through
successful completion of the patent prosecution process. Perhaps
the Federal Text should provide a short period of automatic per-
fection to protect a secured party against the unanticipated emer-
gence of a patent from a trade secret. A short period giving federal
effect to the state filing would accomplish the same result.
Some precedent for this protection may be found in the 1989
Official Text's choice of law rules, which apply to security interests
in goods that are properly filed in one jurisdiction but are removed
to a new jurisdiction m which there is no filing. The perfected
-2 See U.C.C. §§ 9-106, 9-302(1); see also § 9-I03(3)(d) (the correct jurisdiction in
which to file is the debtor's location).
-3 See U.C.C. §§ 9-106, 9-302(1)(a), 9-305.
2 See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text (discussion of possession of general
intangibles m connection with the possession requirements of U.C.C. § 9-312(4)).
21 A security interest in patents or trademarks may be temporarily automatically
.perfected if it is m proceeds. See U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1)(b), 9-306(3); cf. § 9-103(3)(e) (choice
of law rule); see also U.C.C. § 9-302(I)(c),(g) (exceptions to the filing requirement permitting
automatic perfection of security interests in general intangibles not applicable to patents or
trademarks).
1" See generally I P RosENBERo, supra note 35, § 3.07 (patenting versus maintenance
of a trade secret).
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status of the security interest continues for four months to allow
the secured party time to discover the removal and file in the new
state. 2 7 By analogy, when a trade secret arising under state law
metamorphoses into a patent, perfection without a federal filing
might be justified for a short period after issuance of the patent.
The secured party would have the opportunity to learn of the
patent and promptly file in the Patent and Trademark Office within
the short periodY8s Otherwise, a lapse in perfection would occur,
which begins upon extinction of the trade secret rights because of
public disclosure259 and continues until a federal filing against the
patent is made.
A better analogy might be found in the 1989 Text provision
that provides temporary automatic perfection for security interests
in proceeds of collateral.2 ° For example, a perfected security in-
terest m inventory is automatically perfected for ten days in the
account receivable created when the debtor sells an item of mven-
tory to a credit buyer. The account receivable is viewed as a
substitute for the inventory and is proceeds even if the inventory
is not beyond reach of the security interest.261 If the security interest
m the account is not already perfected by filing, the secured party
has ten days to file. 2
U.C.C. § 9-i03(i)(d). Technically speaking, this is not a case of automatic perfec-
tion. Rather, the filing in the first state is good for four months m the second state.
The change-of-collateral-location analogy based on this section seems a bit stronger
than a change-of-debtor-location analogy based on U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(e), even though the
former choice of law rule applies to goods whereas the latter is applicable to general
intangibles. However, either rule might analogously support a short period during which a
state filing has federal effect. Article 9's rules relating to certificated goods that move from
one title state to another, which are contained m U.C.C. § 9-103(2)(b), also nught provide
an analogy. See The United States Trademark Assoc., Trademark Review Commission
Report and Recommendations to the U.S.T.A. President and Board of Directors, 77
Trademark Rep. 375, 444 n.121 (1987).
m Four months may be too long for the Federal Text. There are 50 states to which
collateral might be removed, but only one Patent and Trademark Office.
"I See I P RosENBnno, supra note 35, § 1.09(2)(a)(1) (disclosure would extingush the
trade secret, leaving the debtor with no trade secret rights to which the security interest
could attach after the patent issues); U.C.C. § 9-203()(c). There can be no perfection
without attachment. U.C.C. § 9-303(i).
-_ U.C.C. §§ 9-302(I)(b), 9-306(3)(c). Tis 1989 Text automatic perfection rule is
applicable to general intangibles such as patents and trademarks. However, it is not appro-
priate for the Federal Text "as is" because it does not contemplate the possibility of federal
filing, and it is unclear whether a patent is proceeds of a trade secret. See supra notes 219-
30 and accompanying text.
See U.C.C. §§ 9-306(2), 9-307(l).
See U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1)(b), 9-306(3)(c).
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A patent that results from a trade secret nght be analogous
to the account that emerges from the sale of inventory, and argu-
ably be "proceeds" subject to the 10 day period supplied by an
unamended 1989 Text. Indeed, the argument for temporary auto-
matic perfection in the patent may be even stronger because the
trade secret is necessarily extinguished when the patent issues, so
the secured party cannot reach the trade secret. 263 If the patent is
viewed as proceeds of the trade secret, 264 perhaps the Federal Text
should specify that a security interest in a patent is automatically
perfected for a short time if the patent covers an invention or
process substantially based upon a trade secret in which a security
interest was perfected under state law.
Are these arguments for short term perfection without a federal
filing persuasive? Perhaps evidence exists that secured financers
need protection against the risk of surprise metamorphosis. Perhaps
a secured party who relies on a trade secret as collateral should be
aware that the secret might be patented and make a low cost
federal filing before the patent's issuance, preferably no later than
the time of the state filing. 265 Yet even though a filing in the correct
office for accounts receivable can be made by the inventory fin-
ancer at the outset, Code drafters have supplied the 10 day period
specified in U.C.C. § 9-306(3). If a patent is regarded as proceeds
of a trade secret, allowing a short period of temporary automatic
perfection m the Federal Text may be consistent with the approach
of the drafters of Article 9 266
C. Priorities
Priority determination is the area of maximum conceptual and
systemic discord between the 1989 U.C.C. and the Patent and.
Lanham Acts. Both systems link priority to some extent to public
filing, but the Code's approach is notice filing while the federal
approach is transaction filing. 2w The two systems' specific priority
rules are no less divergent. This section considers which rules are
preferable for the Federal Text, or whether new rules should be
formulated.
26 See supra note 259.
26 See supra notes 245-51 and accompanying text.
20 A lender might monitor the collateral and make additional filings as they become
appropriate. See Mesroblan & Schaefer, supra note 3, at 829.
2" It is left to others to decide whether ten days or some other period is appropriate.
267 See supra notes 67-88 and accompanying text.
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1. Secured Creditors, Assignees, and Licensees
The authors consider three sets of persons who may assert
rights in or relating to patents or federally registered trademarks.
The first set consists of creditors who have obtained security inter-
ests, that is, those who have obtained an "interest in personal
property which secures payment or performance of an obliga-
tion," whatever the legal form in which they have obtained it.
This set would include Article 9 secured creditors as well as persons
who structure their transactions as collateral assignments, condi-
tional assignments, or mortgages, even though these forms purport
to transfer title to the creditor.3 9
The term "assignees" describes the second set of persons who
may assert rights in or relating to patents or trademarks. Assignees
include persons who obtain some sort of ownership rights m these
intellectual assets. For patents, the hallmarks of ownership are
exclusivity, the right to transfer, and the right to sue infringers. 270
For trademarks, an assignee stands in the assignor's shoes and has
standing to sue for infringement.271 The set of assignees as defined
includes persons referred to in intellectual property law as assign-
ees, grantees, purchasers, and conveyees.
The third set consists of "licensees." Thus term describes per-
sons who do not obtain a property interest in the patent or trade-
mark, but merely acquire a promise by the intellectual property's
owner not to sue for infringement. 272
The terms "assignee" and "licensee" are used with some trep-
idation because their use is not intended to import into priority
determinations under the Federal Text all of the intellectual prop-
erty law regarding various types of assignments and licenses. In
the authors' view, assignments and licenses have much in common:
both are means for exploiting the economic potential residing in
patents or trademarks. 273 Assignments and licenses do not neces-
sarily require different priority rules, but this Article distinguishes
between them only to consider whether different priority rules may
U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-102(1)(a).
27 See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
271 See id.
See id.
27 See id.
[VoL. 79
1990-91] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS
be appropriate. 274 If different priority rules for assignments and
licenses are appropriate, it may be because of differences in the
commercial context of assignment and license transactions and not
because of doctrinal distinctions founded in intellectual property
law
2. Priorities Among Secured Creditors
The 1989 Text contains a number of priority rules applicable
to secured creditors. The most fundamental is that the first secured
creditor to file has priority.275 Under the first-to-file rule, notice is
irrelevant. 276 The first filer will have priority even if she learns of
another person's perfected security interest before entering into a
security agreement with the debtor or before she files. 277 No rela-
tion-back period is provided.
By contrast, the Patent and Lanham Acts provide that an
assignment (read "security interest") is void against any subsequent
security interest for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless
the interest is recorded within three months from its date, or prior
to any subsequent assignment.278 Notice of an unfiled security
interest subordinates a subsequent creditor even if that creditor
files first.
2' This Article leaves determinations of the dividing line between assignments and
licenses to the law of intellectual property. Whether the Federal Text should have any role
in defining the boundaries of the two sets for purposes of financing is an issue for further
consideration by others.
27S U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) provides that "conflicting security interests rank according to
pnority m time of filing or perfection." Under the 1989 Text, this effectively is a first-to-
file rule for security interests in patents or trademarks because other means of perfection
are largely unavailable. See supra notes 252-55 and accompanying text. Of course, a filing
will be insufficient for priority, even if it is first in time, if the security interest never
attaches to the collateral for lack of a security agreement or for some other reason. See
U.C.C. § 9-203(l). In the event that conflicting security interests are unperfected, "the first
to attach has priority." Id. § 9-312(5)(b). Concerning the 1989 Text's other priority rules
applicable to security interests, see infra notes 284-89.
276 But see U.C.C. § 9-401(2), which provides that certain improper but good faith
filings are effective with regard to collateral covered by the financing statement against any
person who has knowledge of the contents of the financing statement. Actual knowledge
of the financing statement's contents is required. See §§ 1-201(25), 9-401 comment 5. Mere
knowledge of the existence of a security interest should be insufficient to invoke U.C.C. §
9-401(2). See J. WrE & R. Suamsms, supra note 98, § 22-17.
7n See U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 1, example 1.
'7 Otherwise, the assignment is good against the world. See Tuman & Sons, Inc. v.
Basse, 113 F.2d 928, 928 (2d Cir. 1940) (assignee of patent entitled to sue for patent
infringement where the assignment had not been recorded according to the statute). For the
precise statutory language, see supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
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The 1989 Text's first-to-file rule should remain in the Federal
Text, and the Patent and Lanham Acts should be amended to
indicate that they do not apply to priority disputes between secured
creditors. The first-to-file principle can be outcome-determinative
under the current federal priority rules, and in those cases, replac-
ing the federal rules with the 1989 Text's would not lead to a
change in results.279 However, elimnating the roles of notice and
relation back in ordering security interests by federalizing the 1989
Text's first-to-file rule would be a significant change.
We have already discussed the merits of elimnating the Patent
and Lanham Acts' relation back periods which can delay a debtor's
access to asset-based financing.20 Moving to a "pure race" first-
to-file rule for competing security interests in patents or trademarks
also is sensible because order of filing is an objective and relatively
easy-to-apply standard. The presence or absence of notice, by
contrast, is far less certain and can raise difficult proof problems. 281
Under the 1989 Text, the creditor filing first can be reasonably
confident of priority in the patent or trademark over other secured
creditors. 2 2 Moreover, the first-to-file principle is essential to ob-
tain the advantages of notice filing and to realize the full potential
of future advance and after-acquired property clauses. 2 3
The 1989 Text also provides important corollary priority rules
that may be equally appropriate for the Federal Text.2 For pur-
'7 The first-in-time, first-m-right principle is the traditional interest-ordenng method
m personal property security law. See J. Wnmr & R. StmHRs, supra note 98, § 24-4, at
1131; Jackson & Kronman, supra note 206, at 1161-64 (one justification is that tls approach
saves transaction costs).
mo See supra notes 123-28, 158 and Iccompanying text.
281 Issues may arise concerning the presence or absence of notice and the date of an
assignment. See 5 E. Lipscoim, supra note 39, § 19:10, at 358-61; Felsenfeld, Knowledge
as a Factor in Determinng Priorities Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 42 N.Y.U.L.REY.
246, 248-51 (1967) (omnission of factor of knowledge from determinations of basic order
of priority between secured parties); 2 R. ALDER.MAN, A TRMSACTiONAL GurmE TO THE
UNoiR. Comn EancL CODE 1063 (2d ed. 1983) (the courts generally have accepted the
irrelevance of notice or knowledge under the Code's first-to-file rule). Occasional cases
applying the Code's good faith requirement (see U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), 1-203) to reverse the
first-to-file principle have been extensively criticized. See B. CLARK, supra note 148,
3.08(l)(a)-(b).
Under the Patent and Lanham Acts' priority rules, the existence of notice is a more
likely issue than the existence of valuable consideration paid by a subsequent purchaser or
mortgagee. Cf. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637,
642 (1947) (patent statute does not limit the consideration for an assignment to any species
or kind of property).
"2But see supra note 276 and accompanying text.
"3 See 2 GmmoRa, supra note 29, at §§ 34.3 - 4.
n4 A person with priority under the first-to-file rule of U.C.C. § 9-312(5) or any of
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poses of applying the first-to-file rule, a date of filing as to collat-
eral is also the date of filing as to proceeds of that collateral.285
For example, if a secured party files to perfect a security interest
in patent A, and patent A subsequently is swapped by the debtor
for patent B, patent B would be proceeds, and the relevant filing
date would be the time of filing against patent A.2,6 Another rule
provides that if future advances are made while a security interest
is perfected by filing, the security interest has the same priority for
purposes of the first-to-file rule with respect to the future advances
as it does with respect to the initial advance.3 7 This rule also is
intended to reinforce the notice filing concept.28 Finally, the pri-
ority of a purchase money security interest in patents or trademarks
may carry through to proceeds of those assets.2s9
the rules described infra notes 285-89 will be superior to unperfected security interests. See
id. § 9-301(1)(a).
n U.C.C. § 9-312(6). The original filing, however, must be effective as to the proceeds.
See § 9-306(3).
See supra notes 219-25 and accompanying text (concerning the definition of "pro-
ceeds").
This example suggests the possibility of a priority dispute between the security interest
in patent A created by secured creditor Alpha and a security interest in patent B created
by secured creditor Beta. Suppose Beta filed against patent B before the swap and before
Alpha filed against patent A. Consider the order of priority in Patent B. The first-to-file
rule applies only to competing security interests created by the same debtor, so it would
not be relevant. See -B. CLAR, supra note 148, 3.08(4). Analysis of the priority issue
must instead move along the following lines-assunung Beta did not consent to or authorize
the swap, its security interest would continue in patent B after the swap. See U.C.C. §§ 9-
306(2), 9-316. Alpha's security interest would attach to its debtor's rights in patent B, which
would be subject to Beta's security interest. See § 9-203(I)(c). Alpha's security interest can
rise no higher than its debtor's rights, so Alpha is subject to Beta's security interest.
U.C.C. § 9-312(7). If a commitment to make advances is given before or while the
security interest is perfected by filing, the security interest has the same priority with respect
to advances made pursuant to the commitment. See §§ 9-I05(I)(k), 9-312(7). In all other
cases, a perfected security interest has priority from the date of the advance. See id. § 9-
312(7).
2 See Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Final Report
of Review Committee for Article 9 226-27 (1971).
U.C.C. § 9-312(4). U.C.C. § 9-312(4) applies to purchase money security interests
in nomnventory collateral. It is evident that this provision was intended to apply to collateral
that may be characterized as "equipment." See U.C.C. § 9-109(2); Permanent Editorial
Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Final Report of Review Comniitee for Article
9 224 (1971). However, it is doubtful that much consideration was given to 9-312(4)'s
application to the proceeds of general intangibles such as patents or trademarks. It provides
that the purchase money priority will carry through to these proceeds only if the security
interest in the patent or trademark is perfected when the debtor receives possession of the
patent or trademark or within ten days thereafter. U.C.C. § 9-312(4). As we have already
discussed, "possession" is problematic in the case of nonreified intangible personalty such
as patents or trademarks. See supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text. The requirements
KENTUCKY LAW JOuRNAL
3. Priorities Among Secured Creditors and Subsequent
Assignees or Licensees
The 1989 Text contains three rules that may apply to priority
disputes among secured creditors who obtain security interests in
patents or trademarks and persons who enter into assignments or
licenses of the collateral with the debtor subsequent to attachment
of the security interests.290 First, if the secured party consents to
subsequent transactions in the security agreement or otherwise,
that consent might amount to an agreement by the secured party
to subordinate any priority over persons who enter into subsequent
transactions with the debtor to which it may otherwise be enti-
tled.291 Such an agreement might be found in usage of trade or
course of dealing. 292 Although the person who enters into the
subsequent transaction with the debtor is unlikely to be a party to
the subordination agreement, she might be a third party benefici-
ary 293 The secured party may be estopped from enforcing its
security interest if it informs a person contemplating a subsequent
transaction with the debtor that a subordination agreement exists,
and that person relies on the commumcaton. 294
The second rule provides that a security interest will not con-
tinue in collateral that is sold, exchanged, or disposed of by the
debtor if the disposition was authorized by the secured party in
the security agreement or otherwise. 295 This rule protects all persons
for obtaimng purchase money priority are discussed supra notes 205-18 and accompanying
text.
2 For convemence, these assignments and licenses are collectively referred to as
"subsequent transactions."
The requirements for attachment are that the debtor sign a secunty agreement, value
be given, and the debtor have rights in the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-203(1). An unattached
security interest is unenforceable against the world. Id. Therefore, assignees or licensees
would not be subject to an unattached security interest.
211 U.C.C. § 9-316 provides that "[n]othing in [Article 9] prevents subordination
by agreement by any person entitled to priority." Cf. id. § 1-209. An official comment
may contemplate that subordination agreements will be entered into by persons who are
entitled to priority under one of Article 9's priority rules with persons who would lack
pnority under that rule absent a subordination agreement. See U.C.C. § 9-316 comment.
However, there seems to be no reason to limit subordination agreements to any narrowly
defined context given that the rationale for their validation must be freedom of contract.
See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), 1-205, 2-208.
293 See B. CLAK, supra note 148, 3.10 at 3-122.
- See U.C.C. § 1-103. Conduct by the secured party also nught be construed as a
waiver of its security interest.
U.C.C. § 9-306(2). This language effectively creates a priority rule. See id. § 9-306
comment 3; Hedrick Savings Bank v. Myers, 229 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Iowa 1975) (upon
proper proof, prior course of dealing may constitute authority to sell collateral pledged in
security agreement).
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who might obtain rights in collateral from the debtor provided
there is an authorized disposition. However, the application of this
rule to licensees is problematic. Under intellectual property law,
licenses may not create a property interest in the licensee.
296 It
ught follow that the debtor's agreeing to a license does not
amount to a "disposition of collateral" within the meaning of the
priority rule and would not create protection for the licensee even
if the license were authorized.
The third 1989 Text rule applies to clashes between secured
parties and persons who are not secured parties, but who are
transferees. 297 Under the priority rule, an unperfected security in-
terest in general intangibles, such as patents or trademarks, is
subordinate to a transferee to the extent the transferee gives value
without knowledge of the security interest and before the security
interest is perfected. 298 Otherwise, the transferee loses. 299 This rule's
application to subsequent transactions is unclear. One issue is
whether a licensee receives a sufficient proprietary interest to be
considered a "transferee.''100
The Patent and Lanham Acts' priority rules described earlier 01
m connection with disputes among secured creditors apply to clashes
between secured creditors and assignees of the debtor. However,
these statutes do not expressly deal with the priority of licensees. 3°2
2m See supra notes 41-46, 51 and accompanying text.
"Transferee" is not defined by the 1989 Text, but is usually given meaning by
modifying language that accompanies it. Such is the case with U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(d). See
generally Felsenfeld, supra note 281, at 257-58; Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code, Final Report of Review Committee for Article 9 229 (1971).
See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(d).
See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-301(1); see also 2 R. ALDERMAN, supra note 281, at 1027-
29.
- See supra notes 41-46, 51 and accompanying text.
30, See supra note 278 and accompanying text. The text statement equates security
interests with assignments. See supra notes 268-74 and accompanying text.
- The Patent and Trademark Office does not investigate the legal effect of documents
presented for filing, so patent licenses may be recorded. 3 P ROSENBERo, supra note 35, §
16.01(1)(2), at 16-5. However, 35 U.S.C. § 261 does not apply to licenses. Id. § 16.01(l)(b),
at 16-12. 15 U.S.C. § 1060 does not expressly provide for recordation of trademark licenses,
but there is authority that licenses may be recorded at the discretion of the Commissioner
of Patents and Trademarks. See I J. McCARTHY, supra note 3, § 18:3. One commentator
recommends that licenses be filed- to obtain protection against bona fide purchasers. See
Bramson, supra note 3, at 1573. Unlike the Patent and Lanham Acts, which are silent on
the recording of licenses or the priority of licensees, federal copyright law permits recording
and provides a priority rule governing conflicts between nonexclusive licensees and copyright
owners. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 205(e) (West 1977 & Supp. 1990). See generally 1 P GOLDSTEIN,
CoPyRIoH'r: PsNcn, L's, LAw AND PRACTI cE § 4.5.3.2 (1989).
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The 1989 Text and Patent and Lanham Acts' priority rules are
better understood with the help of an example.
Assume Creditor takes a security interest in Debtor's patent or
trademark but fails to record its interest before the intellectual
property is assigned or licensed by Debtor to Subsequent Taker
("ST"). 30 1 Creditor properly records one month after Debtor and
ST enter into that subsequent transaction.
To apply the 1989 Text's pnonty rules, it is important to
distinguish between any residual interest Debtor has in the intellec-
tual property after the transaction with ST and the rights obtained
by ST 304 Creditor's security interest clearly continues m the residual
interest to the extent it was not affected by the transaction between
Debtor and ST 305 The difficulty comes when the Debtor conveys
an interest that was encumbered by the security interest. Under the
1989 Text, the security interest continues in and is superior to the
rights obtained by ST unless ST is protected by a more specific
priority rule.306 Thus, the importance of the priority rule lies m
whether Creditor will be able to extinguish ST's rights through
foreclosure procedures taken against the patent or trademark m
the event Debtor defaults. An affirmative answer means, for ex-
ample, that Creditor will be able to employ its post default remedy
to sell the intellectual property to a purchaser who takes free and
clear of ST's rights. 30 7
"I Collateral assignments may contain restrictions on the right to assign or license. See
Bramson, supra note 3, at 1583. Under the 1989 Text, Debtor may voluntarily transfer
rights in the collateral "notwithstanding a provision m the security agreement prohibiting
any transfer" or making it a default. U.C.C. § 9-311.
The hypothetical assumes that there is a clash between the security interest and the
subsequent transaction. This would not necessarily be the case. For example, Creditor's
security interest nght be in all Debtor's rights to make, use, or sell a patented invention
in the United States east of the Mississippi, while ST is assigned all rights m the rest of the
United States. In that case there would be no conflict.
The analysis of Creditor's priority is somewhat analogous to the analysis of the
rights of a secured party holding a security interest in goods that are leased by the debtor.
See generally Hams, The Rights of Creditors Under Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. Rnv. 803 (1988)
(a lucid analysis of lease priority issues is provided).
m If Debtor enters into a one year nonexclusive license with ST, Debtor retains all
other rights in the intellectual property. These include the right to enter into additional
licenses and the right to have the property free and clear of ST's license upon the license's
ternmnation. If Debtor unconditionally assigns all its rights in the intellectual property to
ST, there is no residual interest in Debtor.
Creditor's security interest may attach to payments made by ST as "proceeds" of the
original intellectual property collateral. See supra notes 225-51 and accompanying text.
- See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-306(2).
" See U.C.C. § 9-504(4). The Patent and Lanham Acts do not deal with secured
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Applying the 1989 Text's three priority rules to our example,
ST takes free of the security interest under the first rule if Creditor
consented to the subsequent transaction so as to subordinate itself
to ST. ST takes free under the second rule if Creditor authorized
the subsequent transaction in the security agreement or otherwise.
A third party such as ST may not know whether there was consent
or authorization for the subsequent transacton 08 ST takes free
under the third 1989 Text priority rule if it gave value and lacked
knowledge of the security interest.3°9 Creditor's subsequent filing
is of no legal significance. If Creditor had filed prior to the
transaction between Debtor and ST, then ST would lose. As a
result of these priority rules, third parties such as ST may feel
compelled to check for filings before entering into assignment or
license transactions.
By contrast, under the Patent or Lanham Acts the contest in
the example is viewed as one between two assignees, Creditor and
ST.310 Assumng the assignments conflict,31 ' Creditor prevails over
ST because it was first-in-time and recorded during the three month
period.312 Absent Creditor's timely recording, ST would prevail so
long as it gave valuable consideration and lacked notice. Under
the federal priority rules, assignees may feel compelled to check
for filings and delay making payments to the assignor.
313
Federal law cannot embody both the 1989 Text's priority rules
and those currently contained m the Patent and Lanham Acts, and
policy makers must choose which rules apply The authors believe
the 1989 Text's rules are preferable for clashes between secured
creditors and parties to subsequent transactions with the debtor.
The authors are not aware of any reason for permitting a secured
creditors' rights upon default, and federal courts may lack jurisdiction to foreclose security
interests m patents or trademarks. See Republic Pictures Corp. v. Security-First Nat'l Bank,
197 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1952). Federal copyright law reflects a decision not to establish a
federal foreclosure system for copyright mortgages. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 123, repnnted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5659, 5738.
-" Article 9 does not provide third parties with a right to inspect security agreements.
See U.C.C. § 9-208. However, there is no requirement that consent to subordination or
authorization be m writing. See U.C.C. §§ 9-306(2), 9-316.
See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(25), (44) (concerning the meaning of "value" and "knowl-
edge").
310 Creditor's security interest is equated with an assignment for purposes of analysis.
The Patent and Lanham Acts do not expressly deal with priority disputes involving licensees.
See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
"I See supra note 303.
12 See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
"I See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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creditor to enjoy a relation-back period if the creditor can make a
low-cost notice filing as would be the case if the 1989 Text is
enacted into federal law 314
Consideration also should be given to the sufficiency of the
1989 Text's priority rules applicable to secured parties and parties
to subsequent transactions with the debtor. The issue is whether
assignees or licensees in the ordinary course of business should be
protected against properly filed security interests that were per-
fected prior to the subsequent transaction.
315
Such a priority rule for ordinary course assignees and licensees
might be justified if secured creditors generally are willing to permit
debtors to enter into subsequent transactions m the ordinary course.
This might be the case if subsequent transactions typically result
in cash flows from which secured obligations can be paid. Creditors
might be willing to waive their secured rights in assignees' or
licensees' interests obtained in the ordinary course in order to
encourage subsequent transactions. It might be, similarly, that third
parties who enter into subsequent transactions in- the ordinary
course reasonably expect that secured parties encourage or, at least,
condone those transactions. If commercial practice is such that
lenders and debtors would normally permit some subsequent takers
to have priority over earlier secured parties, statutory priority rules
to that effect could reduce the costs of secured lending by making
it unnecessary to include such choices in the loan contracts.
316
A similar range of expectations justifies 1989 Text priorities
protecting buyers or lessees of goods in the ordinary course against
earlier perfected security interests in those goods, 317 but whether
such priority choices are empirically justified in the intellectual
property field is unknown. If similar expectations are prevalent in
314 There also are good reasons for minimizing the role of notice in priority rules. See
supra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
3,1 Of course, assignments and licenses are very different transactions, and it may be
unwise to treat the priority of assignees and licensees as if they were the same. See mnfra
note 322.
3M6 See Hams, supra note 304, at 812-13. Potential subsequent transferees would not
feel compelled to determine whether the patent or trademark to be assigned or licensed is
encumbered by a security interest. Nonetheless, a potential subsequent transferee might
check the record to determine whether the intellectual property is owned by the potential
assignor or licensor.
117 The policy is one of protecting reasonable expectations on the part of the buyer or
lessee. See U.C.C. §§ 2A-307, 9-307. See generally Hams, supra note 304, at 813. The
authors are uncertain of the reasonable expectations of assignees or licensees of patents or
trademarks.
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this area of commercial practice, revision of the 1989 Text will be
in order because the only means in the 1989 Text for giving weight
to these expectations resides m the possibility that the secured
creditor agreed to subordinate its priority or authorized the sub-
sequent transaction "in the security agreement or otherwise. ' '
318
This, of course, requires a case-by-case determination 19 of the
presence or absence of agreement or authorization-a process that
can inject costly uncertainty into loan contracts. 320 A priority rule
protecting assignees or licensees in the ordinary course would re-
duce uncertainty because it would give priority over secured claims
even when the secured party did not agree to subordinate, or the
subsequent transaction was unauthorized.
32'
The authors propose only that thought be given to the need
for a priority rule protecting some subsequent transactions in the
ordinary course. Whether the idea has merit, and if so, the rule's
scope and operation will depend on the answers to many questions,
most of which are based m the actual commercial practice m this
area. For example, it may be that commercial practice and expec-
tations are such that the rule is appropriate only for licenses in the
ordinary course but not for assignments of any sort.32 The com-
M See U.C.C. §§ 9-306(2); 9-316.
1' See Hams, supra note 304, at 813-15.
"0 Uncertainty results because neither the secured party nor the person who enters into
the subsequent transaction with the debtor can predict who will prevail in the event of a
priority dispute. This may cause the secured party to insist on a higher interest rate or
additional collateral or cause the assignee or licensee to reduce what it is willing to pay for
an assignment or license.
32 One might justify this on the basis of empirically supported expectations of third
parties who could be expected to take interests in encumbered federal intellectual property.
It is not known what the expectations of subsequent takers are in tins field.
The authors think it is unlikely that many owners of intellectual property are in the
business of entering into assignment or license transactions in the same way as wholesalers
or retailers may be in the business of leasing or selling goods. Thus, it will be important to
calibrate the priority rule through a suitable definition of "ordinary course." The definition
could look to the good faith and knowledge of the assignee or licensee, the nature of the
assignor or licensor, the value paid to the debtor for entering into the subsequent transaction,
and so forth. Cf. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(9) (definition of "buyer in the ordinary course of
business"), 2A-103(l)(o) (definition of "lessee in ordinary course of business").
Many assignments of patents or patent applications are from employees to employers.
See generally 2 P RosmEmNBE, supra note 35, ch. 11 (the inventorsip entity and rights of
employers and employees). If most assignments are of this type, then a priority rule
protecting assignees in the ordinary course may be unwarranted.
32 Many assignment of patents or patent applications are from employees to employers.
See generally 2 P Rosm, mo, supra note 35, ch. 11 (the inventorship entity and rights of
employers and employees). If most assignments are of this type, then a priority rule
protecting assignees in the ordinary course may be unwarranted. A rule protecting only
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mercial context of those subsequent transactions that do merit
priority protection will need to be carefully defined and reflected
in the priority rule..32
4. Priorities Among Secured Creditors and Prior Assignees or
Licensees
A different sort of priority issue arises if a person assigns or
licenses a patent or trademark and subsequently grants a security
interest in its assignor's or licensor's interest to a creditor.3 u In
many cases following an assignment or license, the debtor may
retain a property interest in the patent or trademark. For example,
if the debtor-patent holder assigned her right to use a patented
process "East of the Mississippi," she would retain her interest in
the West. As another example, if she licensed a patent or trademark
for a term of years, she nught retain a reversion interest once the
license expired.
Suppose Debtor enters into a prior assignment or license trans-
action with PT, and Creditor then obtains a security interest ("as-
signment" under federal law) of "all the debtor's interests" in the
patent or trademark that had been the subject of the prior trans-
action. Suppose then that Creditor records immediately and PT
records one month later.32 What are the relative rights of Creditor
and PT 9
If one proceeds under the 1989 Text, the law will provide
neither for the recordation of prior transactions nor a priority rule
governing clashes between parties to prior transactions and secured
creditors.32 Resolution of the relative rights of PT and Creditor
licensees in the ordinary course would require determination of whether a particular sub-
sequent transaction falls into the assignment or license category. See supra notes 35-53 and
accompanying text.
323 See supra note 321.
32 For convemence, these assignments and licenses are collectively referred to as "prior
transactions." It is assumed throughout the discussion in this part that the creditor's security
agreement adequately describes the assignor's or licensor's interest. Merely referring to the
patent or trademark may not be sufficient. See U.C.C. §§ 9-110, 9-203(I)(a).
32 The Patent and Lanham Acts provide for recordation of assignments. Licenses also
may be accepted for recording, but with uncertain results. Neither the Patent nor the
Lanham Act expressly provides for the priority of licensees. See supra note 302 and
accompanying text.
126 See generally Baird & Jackson, Iformation, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of
Property, 13 J. LEG. STuo. 299, 310-11 (1984) (possession-based regime versus a title-
recording system for abstract rights).
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would probably turn on reasomng like the following: 327 creditor's
security interest could attach only to Debtor's rights following the
prior transaction, it could not attach to rights previously trans-
ferred by the debtor.321 Therefore, there would be no conflict, and
PT would be free from Creditor's claim.
3 29
Analysis under the Patent and Lanham Acts must proceed in
a very different manner. Unlike the 1989 Text, these statutes pro-
vide for the recording of assignments and make the time of re-
cording an outcome-determinative factor. 3 0 Assuming the prior
transaction was an assignment and recalling that we must equate
security interests with assignments for purposes of analysis under
these federal statutes, 331 the priority issue simply becomes one
among competing assignees. Creditor lacked notice of the unre-
corded transaction between Debtor and PT, which would be "void"
as against Creditor but for PT's eventual recordation. PT recorded
the transaction during the three month period with the result that
PT has priority over Creditor.
By waiting three months before extending credit, Creditor nught
have protected itself against the risk that a prior transaction might
be recorded after Creditor recorded.3 2 Unfortunately, a waiting
period can deprive debtors of needed funds and reduce the value
of their intellectual property as collateral. 333 The authors propose
for the Federal Text an explicit priority rule for contests among
secured creditors and prior assignees that provides a significantly
shortened period for the transmission and recording of assignment
transaction documents. The period's duration is not specified, but
modern means such as telecopiers, overnight deliveries, and com-
puterized filing systems can make it very short indeed.
3" The Code does not displace the common law principle that one cannot transfer
rights greater than one's own. See R. Hn nAN, J. McDoNmEu, AND S. Nicxi.rs, supra
note 230, 18.01(1), (2) (general approach).
3 See U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c).
32 Cf. Septembertide Publishing, B.V v. Stein & Day, Inc., 884 F.2d 675 (2d Cir.
1989). If the prior transaction is a license, then tus result also might coincide with intellectual
property law. An assignee of a patent takes it subject to prior valid licenses whether or not
the assignee had knowledge of them. See 5 E. Lipscoam, supra note 39, at 459.
3" They do not provide for recording licenses. See supra note 302 and accompanying
text.
331 See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
332 See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text. As pointed out earlier, to be sure
no prior assignment will have priority, creditor should delay extending funds for the
statutory three-month period plus the time it takes the Patent and Trademark Office to get
the assignment into the file.
3 See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
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For prior licensees, the general rule is that assignees take subject
to prior valid licenses whether or not the assignee had knowledge
of them. 3 4 This raises additional questions and policy choices.
Neither the Patent nor the Lanham Act now provide for recorda-
tion of licenses or specify the effect of such recordation, and there
may be no relatively certain way to determine if a patent or
trademark is subject to a preexisting license. 335 Should federal law
be changed to require recordation of some or all licenses in the
interests of better information for subsequent assignees and secured
parties? 36 Or, as a middle ground, might the tune an unrecorded
license remains valid against subsequent assignees and licensees be
statutorily limited? The authors leave these matters to others to
suggest answers grounded in the commercial needs and practices
in this field.
VI. CONCLUSION: OTHER ITEMS FOR THE AGENDA
This Article's agenda is not intended as exhaustive, but rather
as one starting point in a reform process that should continue.
Many other areas require analysis. For example, all the priority
issues were not discussed. Nor have the rights of creditors who
obtain and assert judgment liens againsf patents, trademarks, or
related rights and secured creditors been considered. 337 In a related
vein, perhaps the reform effort should address not only how se-
cured creditors obtain security interests, but also how judgment
creditors obtain their liens as well. This issue is so closely related
to financing that it might be covered in a comprehensive statute.
331 See 5 E. Lu'scomB, supra note 39, at 459. When two licenses conflict, the earlier
one prevails even if the later one was entered into with no notice of the first. See 3 P
RosENmto, supra note 35, at 16-17.
M This raises the further question of how one deternunes whether there is a prior
license that calls for insufficient royalties, thereby devaluing the patent.
- A possible analogous issue-whether lessors should file chattle leases-was present
in the development of Article 2A. See Mooney, The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible
Ownership" and Article 9 Filing: A Critique of Proposals to Extend Filing Requirements
to Leases, 39 ALA. L. REv 683 (1988). The drafters resolved the issue against required
filing. See U.C.C. § 2A-301 comment. Federal copyright law does provide for the recording
and priority of nonexclusive licenses. See supra note 302.
"I Under the 1989 Text a lien creditor would have priority over a prior security interest
that is not perfected by filing. See U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b). Under general intellectual property
and creditors' rights law the outcome may be analyzed in terms of "title." See generally 5
E. Liscois, supra note 39, § 19:34.
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To the extent the rules are clear, the system will become more
efficient.33
Another topic meriting study is default. The Uniform Com-
mercial Code exhaustively specifies remedies, notice requirements,
and consequences of failure to follow the default rules. Federal
statutory law says nothing,339 and unintentionally may contradict
the U.C.C. The structure of a secured transaction as a collateral
assignment suggests the secured party has title 34° and may keep the
collateral if the debtor defaults. A conditional assignment of title
suggests that at default the secured party gets title and obtains the
collateral free and clear regardless of the size of the remaining
obligation or the value of the collateral at default. 41 In many
cases, these results would clearly contradict the rules outlined in
the 1989 Text. 2 If there is a contradiction between the U.C.C.
and the federal statutory law, which is better as a matter of policy9
Procedures for realizing value from federal intellectual property
collateral mght be spelled out within the statute.
The structure of the federal transaction also has yielded results
that a differently conceptualized secured transaction might not.
The assignment-of-title form may vest in the secured party the
exclusive right to prosecute infnngement343 and may expose that
secured party (as "owner") to potential infringement liability. Ar-
ticle 9's rules, which minimize the importance of title, would seem
to lead to the opposite result in these situations.Y Policymakers
also ought to consider which approach is the best policy 341
M' One commentator noted that there was m 1989 no literature or authority to help
one resolve the questions a judgment creditor would face in attempting to collect its
judgment from a judgment debtor's trademarks. M. Simensky, Enforcing Creditors' Rights
Against Trademarks 2 (1989) (unpublished manuscript; copy on file with the Kentucky Law
Journal). Secured creditors may exercise the rights of a judgment creditor. U.C.C. § 9-
501(l), (5).
M See supra note 307.
m" See supra note 3.
34" Cf. M. Simensky, supra note 338, at 16-24.
- Article 9 generally requires the secured party to sell the collateral and, if it exceeds
the debt, to account to the debtor for the surplus. See U.C.C. §§ 9-504(2), 9-505; cf.
Warnaco v. Farkas, 872 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1989) (termination by the seller of a trademark
licensing agreement entered into in connection with the sale of trademarks and other assets
must comply with the post-default requirements in Part V of Article 9).
31 See Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891).
3- See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-202, 9-317.
.14 This is not to advocate an opposite rule that would prohibit the secured party from
prosecuting an infringement action. As developed earlier in notes 231-37 and accompanying
text, it may make sense to allow the secured party to claim an infringement action as
proceeds of a patent or trademark. In that event, it also nght make sense that the secured
party should be able to prosecute the infringement action after the debtor's default.
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Finally, trademark law relating to "assignments m gross" cre-
ates a special problem for secured creditors that also might be
addressed in the reform process. This doctnne of trademark law
has long specified that one may not assign a trademark apart from
the underlying goodwill of the business.346 The rationale is one of
protecting the public from confusion that would result if, for
example, the trademark "Coca Cola" were affixed by an assignee
to a line of shoes. 347 Additionally, the doctrine may serve to pre-
serve economic value: goods formerly represented by the trademark
would, presumably, become much less valuable without the product
identification the trademark provided. 34 As a result of this doc-
tnne, creditors must take security interests in both the trademark
and substantial enough business assets, including good will, to
permit the product and trademark to continue their association.
349
Questions for policymakers include whether appropriate assignment
in gross rules are suitable for codification in a -comprehensive
reform statute dealing with intellectual property financmg.5 0
It should be clear that the reform process will be a long one
and has scarcely begun. But with an improved system for employ-
346 See 15 U.S.C. § 1060. See generally 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 3, § 18:1.
' M. Simensky, supra note 338, at 38. The court in Marshak v. Green put it tins
way:
Use of the mark by the assignee in connection with a different goodwill and
different product would result in a fraud on the purchasing public who
reasonably assume that the mark signifies the same thing, whether used by
one person or another.
Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1984).
3 M. Simensky, supra note 338, at 38-39.
'49 See, e.g., Premier Dental Prods. Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850
(3d Cir. 1986); Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1984); Money Store v. Harriscorp
Finance, Inc., 689 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1982); Pepsico, Inc. v. Grapette Co., 416 F.2d 285
(8th Cir. 1969). See generally Mesrobian & Schaefer, supra note 3, at 850-51.
M Employing a conditional assignment to take place in the future, rather than a
present assignment, may avoid the assignment in gross problem prior to the debtor's default.
See I J. McCARTnn, supra note 3, at 796. Formalizing the transaction as a security
agreement in a trademark rather than as a conditional assignment also- should avoid the
problem prior to default because granting a security interest is not the equivalent of
conveying title. See supra note 344. However, the problem arises again after the debtor's
default, when the secured party seeks to enforce the security interest. It has been proposed
that the Lanham Act be amended to state there is no assignment in gross after the debtor's
default provided the secured party subsequently engages in the business to winch the mark
relates or holds the mark for transfer to a person who also acquires the associated business
goodwill. See S. 1883, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). See generally The United States
Trademark Assoc., Trademark Review Comrmssion Report and Recommendations to the
U.S.T.A. President and Board of Directors, 77 Trademark Rep. 375, 439, 446 (1987). Tins
proposal was not enacted. See Pub. L. No. 667; 100th Cong. (1988).
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ing patents and trademarks as collateral, the costs of financing
should be reduced. The reform efforts will have been worth it if
they reduce uncertainty and legal complexity and thereby add or
restore value to federal intellectual property.

